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AbstractWill AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article revisits Cold War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional weapons) through various mechanisms and pathways could affect inadvertent escalation risk between nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional crisis or conflict. How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? It unpacks the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorising (the security dilemma, the 'fog of war', and military doctrine and strategy) to examine whether and how the characteristics of AI technology, against the backdrop of a broader political-societal dynamic of the digital information ecosystem, might increase inadvertent escalation risk. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital age? The article speaks to the broader scholarship in International Relations – notably 'bargaining theories of war' – that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of war occurs through its political effects, rather than tactical or operational battlefield alterations. In this way, it addresses a gap in the literature about the strategic and theoretical implications of the AI-nuclear dilemma.

This article revisits the Cold War-era concept of 'catalytic nuclear war,' considered by many as unworkable, and reconceptualizes it in light of technological change, as well as improved understanding of human psychology and other factors. It argues in the modern digital era, the catalyzing chain of reaction and counter-retaliation dynamics set in motion by the deliberate action of a non-state or third-party actor is fast becoming a more accessible and plausible alternative to acquiring a nuclear weapon or manufacturing an improvised atomic device – or 'dirty bomb.' The article concludes that artificial intelligence (AI) technology is creating new – and exacerbating old – escalation pathways that risk catalyzing accidental nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed powers, particularly under irrational (or sub-rational) conditions. Are existing notions of accidental and inadvertent nuclear escalation still relevant in the age of AI and autonomy?

Political scientists invoke the standard rationale to justify making and using formal models. It goes like this: (1) we rely on formal models to generate predictions, (2) we treat these predictions as empirical hypotheses, and (3) we seek to test these hypotheses against evidence derived from the "real world." I show that this interpretation of formal models as directly empirical is inadequate just insofar as it fails to capture the way we actually use them. I then offer an alternative rationale for making and using formal models. Specifically, I argue that we use models, like we use fables, for conceptual purposes.