Political regime change, economic liberalization and growth accelerations
In: Public choice, Band 146, Heft 1, S. 93-116
ISSN: 0048-5829
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In: Public choice, Band 146, Heft 1, S. 93-116
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: KOF Working Paper No. 252
SSRN
Working paper
We examine the impact of leadership change after a coup d'etat on economic growth. We consider successful coup attempts as our treatment group and use failed coup attempts as controls to condition on political instability. To take account of selection bias, we control for the determinants of coup success. Our main finding is that leadership changes after a coup d'état have a positive effect on economic growth in the least developed countries, but have a negative effect in other developing countries.
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In: Bezemer , D & Jong-A-Pin , R 2007 ' World on Fire? Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence ' s.n.
Recent studies suggest that democracy and globalization lead to ethnic hatred and violence in countries with a rich ethnic minority. We examine the thesis by Chua (2003) that democratization and globalization lead to ethnic violence in the presence of a market-dominant minority. We use different data sets to measure market dominant minorities and employ panel fixed effects regressions for a sample of 107 countries over the period 1984-2003. Our model contains two-way and three-way interactions to examine under which conditions democracy and globalization increase violence. We find no evidence for a worldwide Chua effect, but we do find support for Chua's thesis for Sub-Saharan Africa.
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In: Jong-A-Pin , R & Mierau , J O 2022 , ' No country for old men : Aging dictators and economic growth ' , Economic Modelling , vol. 107 , 105714 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105714 ; ISSN:0264-9993
Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? An emerging literature is highlighting that in addition to economic and institutional variables, personal characteristics of political leaders affect economic growth rates. Within this tradition, we develop a political-economic growth model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. The model predicts that if a dictator's mortality risk increases, the economic growth rate in his country decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a large sample of more than 400 dictators from 76 countries. A 1-year increase in dictator age, decreases economic growth by 0.12 percentage points. Using random leadership transitions due to natural deaths or terminal illnesses we establish that this effect is not driven by endogenous sample selection. As expected, the effect is absent in democratic political regimes.
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This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. In the model a dictator must spread the resources of the economy over his reign but faces mortality and political risk. The model shows that if the time horizon of the dictator decreases, either due to an increase of mortality risk or political risk, the economic growth rate decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a threeway fixed effects model including country, year and dictator fixed effects for a sample of dictators from 116 countries. These results are robust to sample selection, the tenure of dictators, the definition of dictatorship, and a broad set of economic growth determinants. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. In the model a dictator must spread the resources of the economy over his reign but faces mortality and political risk. The model shows that if the time horizon of the dictator decreases, either due to an increase of mortality risk or political risk, the economic growth rate decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a threeway fixed effects model including country, year and dictator fixed effects for a sample of dictators from 116 countries. These results are robust to sample selection, the tenure of dictators, the definition of dictatorship, and a broad set of economic growth determinants.
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In: Public choice, Band 146, Heft 1-2, S. 93-115
ISSN: 1573-7101
We examine whether the type of political regime, regime changes, and economic liberalization are related to economic growth accelerations. Our results show that growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalizations. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen the longer a political regime-be it a democracy or an autocracy-has been in place, while (a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset reduces the likelihood of growth accelerations. Adapted from the source document.
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. In the model a dictator must spread the resources of the economy over his reign but faces mortality and political risk. The model shows that if the time horizon of the dictator decreases, either due to an increase of mortality risk or political risk, the economic growth rate decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a threeway fixed effects model including country, year and dictator fixed effects for a sample of dictators from 116 countries. These results are robust to sample selection, the tenure of dictators, the definition of dictatorship, and a broad set of economic growth determinants.
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In: Jong-A-Pin , R & De Haan , J 2011 , ' Political regime change, economic liberalization and growth accelerations ' , Public Choice , vol. 146 , no. 1 , pp. 93-115 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9585-x ; ISSN:0048-5829
We examine whether the type of political regime, regime changes, and economic liberalization are related to economic growth accelerations. Our results show that growth accelerations are preceded by economic liberalizations. We also find that growth accelerations are less likely to happen the longer a political regime-be it a democracy or an autocracy-has been in place, while (a move toward) more democracy according to the Polity IV dataset reduces the likelihood of growth accelerations.
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In: Public choice, Band 146, Heft 1-2, S. 93-115
ISSN: 1573-7101
Using an improved definition and indicator of growth accelerations, we examine whether political regimes, regime changes, and economic reform are related to growth accelerations. Our results show that economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic reforms. Furthermore, we find that growth accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a new political regime.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1905
SSRN
In: Jong-A-Pin , R & De Haan , J 2007 ' Growth Accelerations and Regime Changes : A Correction ' s.n.
We argue that the finding of Hausmann et al. (2005) that a political regime change increases the probability of an economic growth acceleration is wrong and the result of an error in their database. When we correct for this error and stick to the definition of regime change of Hausmann et al., we find that regime changes do not affect the likelihood that a growth acceleration occurs. We also find some evidence that economic liberalization increases the probability of a growth acceleration, independent of whether this acceleration is sustained.
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7541
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