This book offers a comprehensive analysis of long- and short-term EU conflict prevention and crisis management policies undertaken in various theatres and policy domains, featuring case studies on West Africa, Afghanistan and the Caucasus.
AbstractThis article undertakes a comparative analysis of European Union security and external economic policies to explore the different trajectories of strategic autonomy (SA) in these two domains. In so doing, it contributes to a better understanding of endogenous drivers of policy change in response to geopoliticising pressures. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, it analyses three dimensions of ideational power: power in, power through and power over. The evidence, based on documentary analysis and interviews, demonstrates that though SA presented a more significant challenge to pre‐established paradigms in external economic relations, the role of the Commission as an ideational entrepreneur, supported by its coercive power, facilitated the adoption of the idea of (open) SA. Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron was unable to persuade others of the adoption of a sovereigntist conception of SA in security, with the exception of defence industrial policy, where the Commission enjoys budgetary power and competences.
International crises, most recently the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, often radically change our view of the world and our place within it. The European Union (EU) has been particularly impacted by these developments because these crises have accentuated some of its ontological and epistemological uncertainties and insecurities. While the EU's resilience turn initiated by the EU Global Strategy of 2016 aimed at strengthening the EU's ability to prepare and recover from external shocks and crises, since then, the concept of resilience has undergone a transformation. In recent years, we have seen the EU turning back in on itself and abandoning the radical aspects of resilience. Hence a paradox has emerged – the more complex the problems faced by the EU, the more it turns away from the logics of complexity present in the idea of resilience. In this article, we examine this conceptual shift through the lenses of concepts in action and the way these have reflected changes in the external context, but also power coalitions and institutional path dependencies. This argument will be explored by examining the recently adopted Strategic Compass and the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).
AbstractInternational crises, most recently the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, often radically change our view of the world and our place within it. The European Union (EU) has been particularly impacted by these developments because these crises have accentuated some of its ontological and epistemological uncertainties and insecurities. While the EU's resilience turn initiated by the EU Global Strategy of 2016 aimed at strengthening the EU's ability to prepare and recover from external shocks and crises, since then, the concept of resilience has undergone a transformation. In recent years, we have seen the EU turning back in on itself and abandoning the radical aspects of resilience. Hence a paradox has emerged – the more complex the problems faced by the EU, the more it turns away from the logics of complexity present in the idea of resilience. In this article, we examine this conceptual shift through the lenses of concepts in action and the way these have reflected changes in the external context, but also power coalitions and institutional path dependencies. This argument will be explored by examining the recently adopted Strategic Compass and the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).
AbstractThis article examines the impact of the introduction of a permanent chair in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty transferred the functions of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented at lower levels by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whilst the permanent chair was intended to improve effectiveness in CFSP negotiations, recent deadlocks challenge such expectations. Drawing on sociological approaches, we show that the ability of EEAS chairs to uphold the impartiality norm has been undermined by the fact that they are perceived as 'outsiders' by national negotiators. This has had negative consequences on the chairs' capacity to fulfil key roles of organiser, broker and political leader and, in turn, negotiation dynamics. Based on these findings, we argue for the need to take norms and identity factors more seriously when designing institutions.
In: Juncos , A E & Pomorska , K 2021 , ' Contesting procedural norms : the impact of politicisation on European foreign policy cooperation ' , European Security , vol. 30 , no. 3 , pp. 367-384 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799
While there is increasing evidence in the literature of politicisation in the area of European foreign policy, we know less about how this has affected the dynamics of cooperation among EU member states and, specifically, the procedural norms that govern this policy. This article is concerned with how politicisation and contestation manifest at the micro-level and how they might shape everyday EU foreign policy negotiations. It seeks to establish to what extent politicisation – resulting from the emergence of a new political cleavage centred around issues of identity and supranational integration – has driven normative contestation within EU foreign policy negotiations and whether this has led to the erosion of long-standing procedural norms in European foreign policy. Our findings suggest that despite CFSP Council committees being an institutional arena, characterised by intergovernmental, relatively insulated, and technical decision-making, current processes of politicisation linked to the rise of populism and the increasing transfer of authority to the EEAS have increased contestation of norms within this setting. However, procedural norms have remained relatively resilient to these challenges.
Capacity building has risen to prominence in the vocabulary of the international community as a way to promote security and development in fragile and post-conflict environments. Capacity building seeks to promote a bottom-up approach drawing on and strengthening existing local capacities. This article argues that capacity building can be understood as part of a broader governmentality that seeks to determine from the outside what constitutes a 'capable' subject. However, the effects of these governance practices are not straightforward as they are constantly shaped by the way local actors on the ground engage with these. Drawing on both policy documents and interviews conducted in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia, the article examines European Union capacity building initiatives in these post-conflict environments. By examining the rationality and problematisations behind this discourse, the article unveils how such assumptions (in particular, regarding the lack of institutions, power and knowledge) result in interactions and contestation between the local and the international in practice, which lead to new outcomes that neither straightforwardly reflect the existing status quo nor represent a linear imposition of power by external capacity builders.
Capacity building has risen to prominence in the vocabulary of the international community as a way to promote security and development in fragile and post-conflict environments. Capacity building seeks to promote a bottom-up approach drawing on and strengthening existing local capacities. This article argues that capacity building can be understood as part of a broader governmentality that seeks to determine from the outside what constitutes a 'capable' subject. However, the effects of these governance practices are not straightforward as they are constantly shaped by the way local actors on the ground engage with these. Drawing on both policy documents and interviews conducted in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia, the article examines European Union capacity building initiatives in these post-conflict environments. By examining the rationality and problematisations behind this discourse, the article unveils how such assumptions (in particular, regarding the lack of institutions, power and knowledge) result in interactions and contestation between the local and the international in practice, which lead to new outcomes that neither straightforwardly reflect the existing status quo nor represent a linear imposition of power by external capacity builders.