Whose ideas are worth spreading? The representation of women and ethnic groups in TED talks
In: Political research exchange: PRX : an ECPR journal, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 1-23
ISSN: 2474-736X
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In: Political research exchange: PRX : an ECPR journal, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 1-23
ISSN: 2474-736X
In: West European politics, Band 42, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1743-9655
In recent decades, a new integration-demarcation cleavage has emerged in Europe, pitting political parties in favour of globalisation against those opposing globalisation. Although a lot is known about the socio-structural basis and the political organisation of this cleavage, we do not know the extent to which these political divides have led to social divides. Therefore, this article investigates how losers and winners of globalisation oppose each other. On the basis of representative online experiments in Germany and Austria, this article studies attitudes and behaviour towards people with different nationalities, education, and party preferences, which correspond to the cultural, socio-structural, and organisational elements of the new cleavage. More particularly, the extent to which people are willing to interact with each other in daily life and how much they trust each other is investigated. The main results show that people who identify with different parties (especially if they belong to the other side of the cleavage) oppose each other much more strongly than people with different nationalities. There is no divide, however, between the low-skilled and high-skilled. Finally, it appears that the social divides are asymmetrical: the winners of globalisation resent the losers more than the other way round.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14198
SSRN
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom
ISSN: 1467-9248
The months around the US 2020 presidential election were characterized by polarization, populism, conspiracy theories, and violent acts, far exceeding usual out-party animosity in western democracies. Using an original two-wave panel survey fielded before the election in November 2020 (n = 3111) and after the inauguration in January 2021 (n = 3384), supported with data from the American National Election Study (ANES, n = 3080), we investigate the dynamics of political violence justification and its connection with populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs. While we find that conspiracy beliefs are associated with higher justification of violence, the relationship with populist attitudes is mixed, and mostly depends on whether people believe in conspiracy theories or not—with populist attitudes being associated with greater political violence justification among those who believe conspiracy theories, while having no or even a negative correlation among those who do not. Finally, results from fixed-effects models provide some evidence for a temporal interpretation of the relationships, indicating that an increase in conspiracy beliefs is strongly and consistently associated with an increased willingness to justify violence.
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 88, Heft 1, S. 175-192
ISSN: 1537-5331
Abstract
We develop the first implicit association test (IAT) to measure general implicit extremist attitudes in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. We find that implicit extremist attitudes are positively but weakly correlated with existing explicit measures. This indicates that implicit measures capture different parts of the population, for example, cases in which associations are based on automated cognitive processes instead of conscious thought. Further results show that particularly the higher-educated and nonreligious respondents score higher on the implicit than on the explicit extremism measures. Our results highlight the importance of studying implicit attitudes of political extremism. We further provide novel insights into how to develop IATs for abstract concepts such as democracy and extremism, for the study of which we cannot use readily available images or concepts.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, Band 86, S. 102704
ISSN: 1873-6890
In: PLOS ONE, Band 16, Heft 12, S. 1-20
Populist attitudes are generally measured in surveys through three necessary and non-compensatory elements of populism, namely anti-elitism, people-centrism, and Manicheanism. Using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 5 (2016-2020) data for 30 countries, we evaluate whether this approach explains voting for populist parties across countries in Asia, Europe and the Americas. We show that the existing scales of populist attitudes effectively explain voting for populists in countries where populist leaders and parties are in opposition but fail to explain voting for populist parties in countries where they are in power. We argue that current approaches assume "the elite" to mean "politicians", thus failing to capture attitudes towards "non-political elites" often targeted by populists in office - in particular, journalists, academics/experts, bureaucrats, and corporate business leaders. The results reveal limits to the usefulness of existing survey batteries in cross-national studies of populism and emphasize the need to develop approaches that are more generalizable across political and national contexts.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 73, Heft 2, S. 409-424
ISSN: 1938-274X
With the recent upsurge of populism in developed and transition democracies, researchers have started measuring it as an attitude. Several scales have been proposed for this purpose. However, there is little direct comparison between the available alternatives. Scholars who wish to measure populist attitudes have little information available to help select the best scale for their purposes. In this article, we directly compare seven populist attitudes scales from multiple perspectives: conceptual development, questionnaire design, dimensionality, information, cross-national validity, and external validity. We use original survey data collected online from nine countries in Europe and the Americas, with around 250 participants per country, in which all seven batteries of questions were present. Results show that most scales have important methodological and validity limitations in at least one of the dimensions tested, and should not be used for cross-national comparative research. We recommend populist attitudes items that work better at capturing populism, and more generally provide guidelines for researchers who want to compare different scales that supposedly measure the same construct.
Die Entwicklung der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen gleicht zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts einer Achterbahnfahrt. Die Anschläge in den USA vom 11. September lösten eine Welle der Solidarität in Deutschland aus. Doch das Ansehen der Vereinigten Staaten litt schon bald beträchtlich unter dem Irakkrieg, während die Wahl Barack Obamas zu Begeisterungsstürmen führte.Vor dem Hintergrund der neuen Rolle Deutschlands in der Welt analysiert dieses Buch, wie Bürgerinnen und Bürger in beiden Ländern auf Veränderungen im internationalen System seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges reagierten und welche Folgen sich für die öffentliche Zustimmung zur transatlantischen Kooperation ergeben. Es zeigt sich, dass sich die Grundüberzeugungen von Deutschen und Amerikanern hinsichtlich der Legitimität von militärischer Gewalt in den internationalen Beziehungen fundamental unterscheiden. Ob sich solche Differenzen aber zu einer echten Krise auswachsen, hängt entscheidend vom Verhalten der politischen Eliten ab.
In: Studien zur Wahl- und Einstellungsforschung, 30
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), Band 119, Heft 44, S. 1-8
This study explores how researchers' analytical choices affect the reliability of scientific findings. Most discussions of reliability problems in science focus on systematic biases. We broaden the lens to emphasize the idiosyncrasy of conscious and unconscious decisions that researchers make during data analysis. We coordinated 161 researchers in 73 research teams and observed their research decisions as they used the same data to independently test the same prominent social science hypothesis: that greater immigration reduces support for social policies among the public. In this typical case of social science research, research teams reported both widely diverging numerical findings and substantive conclusions despite identical start conditions. Researchers' expertise, prior beliefs, and expectations barely predict the wide variation in research outcomes. More than 95% of the total variance in numerical results remains unexplained even after qualitative coding of all identifiable decisions in each team's workflow. This reveals a universe of uncertainty that remains hidden when considering a single study in isolation. The idiosyncratic nature of how researchers' results and conclusions varied is a previously underappreciated explanation for why many scientific hypotheses remain contested. These results call for greater epistemic humility and clarity in reporting scientific findings.