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As part of the project Why Centralization and Decentralization in Federations?, this article measures dynamic de/centralization in Germany since 1949 and seeks to explain the patterns observed. It shows stability in numerous policy fields as well as an overall marked centralization over time, especially in the fiscal and administrative spheres. The principal instrument of dynamic de/centralization has been the enactment of legislation in fields of shared responsibility, with constitutional change also being important. In the 1950s and 1960s, an incremental centralization occurred as political and administrative elites strongly favored uniform living conditions. In a context of Keynesian interventionism and a broad consensus about social planning, the Great Fiscal Reform of 1969 amplified this centralizing trend. The East-West unification of 1989-1990 increased the economic and fiscal heterogeneity of the Lander and challenged the cultural norm of uniformity. The resulting federalism reforms of 2006 and 2009 blended decentralizing and centralizing measures.

Tensions between regionalist claimants and state-wide governments remain the primary source of violent conflicts. Existing theories cannot systematically explain why and when state-wide governments accede to such claims. Building on the partisan approaches developed so far, a theory of ideological authority insulation is constructed in this article. It is argued that the willingness of state-wide parties to transfer authority to specific territorial entities is predominantly informed by ideological proximity to those entities. In a nutshell, the dominant conflict dimension in a country superimposes partisan rationales on the territorial dimension. A new dataset has been compiled with roughly 4,300 region-cabinet dyads between 1945 and 2015, including electoral data, party positions and regional 'centres of gravity'. Using panel rare-events regressions, it is found that ideological proximity systematically explains the accommodation of minority demand controlling for alternative explanations from the partisan and ethnic conflict literature. The empirical evidence therefore supports adding ideological insulation and superimposition to the toolbox of partisan and conflict researchers. Additionally, the findings encourage the application of arguments from the conflict literature in established democracies and the testing of insights from partisan researchers in less democratic environments.

Analyzing the role of the Bundestag in the professional lives of Federal Ministers at three different time points -- before, during, & after their ministerial career -- reveals: More than 70 percent were members of parliament before their first cabinet appointment. This share increases to about 90 percent during their term in office. After their resignation from the cabinet 75 percent choose a smooth transition to parliamentary membership. The dominant pattern in the careers of Federal Ministers is a "sandwich" constellation: Most ministers not only use the Bundestag as a springboard in their careers but also strengthen their cabinet positions by serving as Members of Parliament. Furthermore, parliamentary membership serves as a safe haven for former cabinet ministers, either to bring their political career to an end or as a transitional solution to finding new options for a political career at other levels. Membership in the Federal Parliament is an inherent part of nearly all ministerial careers in Germany. Adapted from the source document.

Research on the formal properties of democratic aggregation mechanisms has a long tradition in political science. Recent theoretical developments, however, show that in the discussion of normative contents of democratic decisions, the actual shape of preferences deserves just as much attention. However, our knowledge about the concrete motivations of individual behavior in democratic decisions is incomplete. Using laboratory experiments, this article examines the existence of social preferences in majority decisions. Contrary to earlier experiments of committee decision making, we develop a design that controls for the conditions of communication and the level of information between subjects. This allows us to comparatively test the predictive power of several theories. We find strong evidence that self‐interest and fairness motivate human behavior in majority decisions.

This article compares ticket-balancing processes in pure and mixed-member proportional systems, which differ with regard to the type of candidature-party list versus combination of single-member and party list. By comparing sub-national elections in Germany between 2000 and 2004, we analyse the impact of double-nominations on the share of safely listed women. Whereas a cross-sectional multiple OLS-regression analysis finds no direct effect except that women's share is dependent on candidate gender quotas and a minimum of two safe list places, there is clear evidence of an interactive relationship between quotas and nominations. Selectors strategically use candidate selection to fulfil gender quotas and frequently nominate female district candidates on safe list places. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]

Selectorates in pure proportional systems may use list nomination procedures to nominate women as well as men in an effort to broaden a party's electoral appeal & to serve intraparty interests. In personalized proportional systems, however, the incentive structure of list nomination is different due to the parallel existence of single-member district nominations. Interaction effects between the nomination procedures are apparent with regard to the high number of double candidacies. This significantly alters the strategic choices of party selectorates. By comparing list nomination procedures preceding elections to the Gen-nan Lander parliaments from 2000 to 2004, we show how an interactive relationship between double nominations & candidate gender quotas accounts for the variance in women's chances of being represented. Adapted from the source document.

Starting from a number of deficiencies in the Comparative Manifestos Project approach to studying left–right policy scales in election programs, an additive model based on the distinction between position and valence issues is proposed. This allows analysis of the policy space in established democracies under the assumption that left and right have different meanings from country to country and over time. The model is illustrated with regard to four Western European countries with different types of party system: Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Empirical findings affirm that the procedures are workable and that the data generated are capable of yielding detailed information beyond that which previous approaches are able to deliver. In addition, preliminary tests on external validity produce reassuring results.