Suchergebnisse

In this article, the term "radicalisation" is discussed as a process that appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of various individuals suffering from social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation, humiliation, and isolation. To that effect, the article challenges the mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so, the work concentrates on the elaboration of reactionary radicalisation processes of self-identified Muslim youth and self-identified native youth residing in Europe. The main reason behind the selection of these two groups is the assumption that both groups are co-radicalizing each other in the contemporary world that is defined by the ascendance of a civilizational political discourse since the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. Based on the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with youngsters from both groups in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the work demonstrates that the main drivers of the radicalisation processes of these two groups cannot be explicated through the reproduction of civilizational, cultural, and religious differences. Instead, the drivers of radicalisation for both groups are very identical as they are both socio-economically, politically, and psychologically deprived of certain elements constrained by the flows of globalization and dominant forms of neo-liberal governance.

In this article, the term "radicalisation" is discussed as a process that appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of various individuals suffering from social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation, humiliation, and isolation. To that effect, the article challenges the mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so, the work concentrates on the elaboration of reactionary radicalisation processes of self-identified Muslim youth and self-identified native youth residing in Europe. The main reason behind the selection of these two groups is the assumption that both groups are co-radicalizing each other in the contemporary world that is defined by the ascendance of a civilizational political discourse since the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. Based on the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with youngsters from both groups in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the work demonstrates that the main drivers of the radicalisation processes of these two groups cannot be explicated through the reproduction of civilizational, cultural, and religious differences. Instead, the drivers of radicalisation for both groups are very identical as they are both socio-economically, politically, and psychologically deprived of certain elements constrained by the flows of globalization and dominant forms of neo-liberal governance.

This country report includes a detailed analysis of reception policies, practices and humanitarian responses from state actors and non-state agencies in Turkey. Data on policies were retrieved through desk research on policy papers and documents at national and sub-national levels, building on the international and EU framework. The analysis of secondary data includes the elaboration of maps of reception policies, practices and humanitarian responses and new typologies of these policies, practices and responses. Evidence on existing practices and responses at the grassroots level have been gathered through interviews and roundtable discussions with key-informants and gatekeepers such as national/local authorities, and NGO representatives. The report also includes the analysis of migrants' perceptions, actions and reactions to reception policies and practices in Turkey. The main framework of reception regulations in Turkey is drawn by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation, both of which were put into force in 2014. Both documents include provisions about housing, education, labour market, allowances, health services and information/counselling services. The definition and scope of 'reception' in Turkish legislation includes various material conditions including housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily allowance. Reception also covers matters of education, basic health care and accommodation which ought to be provided during the period of reception. Similar to the EU legislation, the time frame of 'reception' is not clearly defined in the Turkish legislation. However, there is an implicit definition: reception starts as soon as the border of a given state has been crossed and an application for international protection has been made. It ends either with the "effective expulsion", "repatriation", "forced/assisted return" of unsuccessful applicants or with the acceptance of their request for protection which, in the terminology of RESPOND, makes them subject to 'integration'

This country report includes a detailed analysis of reception policies, practices and humanitarian responses from state actors and non-state agencies in Turkey. Data on policies were retrieved through desk research on policy papers and documents at national and sub-national levels, building on the international and EU framework. The analysis of secondary data includes the elaboration of maps of reception policies, practices and humanitarian responses and new typologies of these policies, practices and responses. Evidence on existing practices and responses at the grassroots level have been gathered through interviews and roundtable discussions with key-informants and gatekeepers such as national/local authorities, and NGO representatives. The report also includes the analysis of migrants' perceptions, actions and reactions to reception policies and practices in Turkey. The main framework of reception regulations in Turkey is drawn by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation, both of which were put into force in 2014. Both documents include provisions about housing, education, labour market, allowances, health services and information/counselling services. The definition and scope of 'reception' in Turkish legislation includes various material conditions including housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily allowance. Reception also covers matters of education, basic health care and accommodation which ought to be provided during the period of reception. Similar to the EU legislation, the time frame of 'reception' is not clearly defined in the Turkish legislation. However, there is an implicit definition: reception starts as soon as the border of a given state has been crossed and an application for international protection has been made. It ends either with the "effective expulsion", "repatriation", "forced/assisted return" of unsuccessful applicants or with the acceptance of ...

"The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: Turkey's AKP, From Conservative Democracy to Conservatism" published on by Oxford University Press.

The research question to be answered in this paper is to what extent Istanbul provides Syrian refugees with a feeling of security and safety despite the practical difficulties of everyday life such as working conditions, exclusion, xenophobia and exploitation. The main premise of the paper is that historical, cultural and religious forms of affinity are likely to particularly attach the Sunni Muslim Arab Syrians originating from Aleppo province to Istanbul. This paper is expected to contribute to the discipline of refugee studies by shedding light on the historical elements and agency that are often neglected in such analyses. Based on the findings of a qualitative and quantitative study conducted by the Support to Life Association among Syrian refugees in Istanbul in the last quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016, this article aims to delineate the strong attachment of the Syrian refugees to the city of Istanbul.

Received 26 Jul 2016, Accepted 17 Oct 2016, Published online: 28 Nov 2016 ; As a clear depiction of unconventional forms of civic and political participation, the Occupygezi movement has revealed that a more comprehensive approach is needed to understand the deep socio-political drives underpinning the Turkish bid for EU membership. Focusing on three different framings, namely Euroenthusiastic, Euro-sceptic and critical Europeanist frames, developed by civil society organizations in Turkey since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, this article will analyze the transformative effect of the Occupygezi movement on various civil society groups which had previously been Euro-sceptic. Subsequently, the article will claim that the critical Europeanist frame has recently become stronger. Methodologically, the article will be based on a literature survey on the civil society actors, as well as discourse analysis of some particular associations, trade unions and the media organizations in relation to their changing perception of the EU before and after the Occupygezi movement.

AbstractThis article analyzes critical voices raised against the Bologna Process by various stake-holders of higher education in Turkey, such as rectors, professors, international office staff, students, and civil society organizations. The data collected through in-depth interviews were analyzed using the discourse analysis method on the basis of the interlocutors' reflections on the Bologna Process. It is claimed in the article that most universities in Turkey have attempted a process of internationalization and institutionalization, but that there have been several impediments during the implementation of the Bologna Process. Rising Euroskepticism in Turkey has also changed the process of Europeanization in the universities. It is revealed that the structural changes made in line with the Bologna Process are perceived by several different stake-holders as neo-liberal acts, and are presented as activities of internationalization, but not of Europeanization.