Governance Indicators: Some Proposals
In: Governance Challenges and Innovations, S. 188-220
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In: Governance Challenges and Innovations, S. 188-220
In: Electoral Studies, Band 45, S. 201-207
In: German politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 106-130
ISSN: 1743-8993
In: German politics: Journal of the Association for the Study of German Politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. [106]-130
ISSN: 0964-4008
World Affairs Online
In: Electoral studies: an international journal
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: German politics: Journal of the Association for the Study of German Politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 106-25
ISSN: 0964-4008
In: Globalization and Domestic Politics, S. 89-112
In: Research & politics: R&P, Band 2, Heft 3
ISSN: 2053-1680
Economic performance is a key component of most election forecasts. When fitting models, however, most forecasters unwittingly assume that the actual state of the economy, a state best estimated by the multiple periodic revisions to official macroeconomic statistics, drives voter behavior. The difference in macroeconomic estimates between revised and original data vintages can be substantial, commonly over 100% (two-fold) for economic growth estimates, making the choice of which data release to use important for the predictive validity of a model. We systematically compare the predictions of four forecasting models for numerous US presidential elections using real-time and vintage data. We find that newer data are not better data for election forecasting: forecasting error increases with data revisions. This result suggests that voter perceptions of economic growth are influenced more by media reports about the economy, which are based on initial economic estimates, than by the actual state of the economy.
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 242-253
ISSN: 1476-4989
Electoral competitiveness is a key explanatory construct across a broad swath of phenomena, finding application in diverse areas related to political incentives and behavior. Despite its frequent theoretical use, no valid measure of electoral competitiveness exists that applies across different electoral and party systems. We argue that one particular type of electoral competitiveness'electoral risk'can be estimated across institutional contexts and matters most for incumbent behavior. We propose, estimate, and make available a cross-nationally applicable measure for elections in 22 developed democracies between 1960 and 2011. Unlike extant alternatives, our measure captures vote volatility and is constructed at the party (not system) level, exogenous to most policy predictors, and congruent with the perceptions and incentives of policy-makers.
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 3, S. 661-684
ISSN: 1537-5943
When the economy in a single country contracts, voters often punish the government. When many economies contract, voters turn against their governments much less frequently. This suggests that the international context matters for the domestic vote, yet most research on electoral accountability assumes that voters treat their national economies as autarkic. We decompose two key economic aggregates—growth in real gross domestic product and unemployment—into their international and domestic components and demonstrate that voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for the domestic than for the international component of growth. Voters in a wide variety of democracies benchmark national economic growth against that abroad, punishing (rewarding) incumbents for national outcomes that underperform (outperform) an international comparison. Tests suggest that this effect arises not from highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from "pre-benchmarking" by the media when reporting on the economy. The effect of benchmarked growth exceeds that of aggregate national growth by up to a factor of two and outstrips the international component of growth by an even larger margin, implying that previous research may have underestimated the strength of the economy on the vote.
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 3, S. 661-685
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 887-908
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 365-394
ISSN: 1475-6765
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 365-395
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 887-909
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760