Suchergebnisse

This article argues that the strictly pragmatic, step-by-step approach of Oslo has reached a dead end and that cajoling the parties into signing an agreement is now irrelevant. To move the peace process to a successful conclusion, the parties must now commit themselves to a principled solution whose key elements include prior commitment to a genuine two-state solution as the end point of the final status negotiations, provision of meaningful citizenship to the Palestinians of the territories and the refugees, and mutual acknowledgment of the other's nationhood and humanity. Such a proposal, though seemingly utopian, represents the most realistic option at the present juncture.

For more than 25 years, my colleagues and I have been developing and applying an unofficial, academically based, third-party approach to the analysis and resolution of international and ethnic conflicts, which I have come to call interactive problem solving. The approach is derived from the seminal work of John Burton (see Burton 1969, 1979, 1984; Kelman 1972). It is anchored in social-psychological principles and follows a scholar/practitioner model. Our practice is informed by theoretical analyses and empirical studies of international conflict, social influence, and group interaction. The experience gained in practice, in turn, contributes to theory building and to the evaluation and refinement of our intervention model. The work thus represents an integration and continuing interaction between practice, research, and theory building.The fullest—in a sense, the paradigmatic—application of the approach is represented by problem-solving workshops, which bring together politically influential members of conflicting parties in a private, confidential setting for direct, noncommittal communication. Workshops are designed to enable the parties to explore each other's perspective and, through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict. The ultimate goal is to transfer the insights and ideas gained from these interactions into the political debate and decision-making processes in the two communities.Problem-solving workshops are not negotiating sessions and they are not intended to simulate and certainly not to substitute for official negotiations.

Since the original goals of Zionism have largely been accomplished or are less relevant today, conditions are ripe for Israel's transition from Zionism to post-Zionism. A post-Zionist Israel—while maintaining its Jewish character and special relationship to world Jewry—would be a state primarily committed to protecting and advancing the interests of its citizens, regardless of ethnicity. In a post-Zionist Israel, the status of non-Jewish Israelis would be up-graded and the status of non-Israeli Jews downgraded. Moreover, Israel would be integrated into the region and engaged in normal, peaceful relations with its neighbors. Many forces are promoting this transition, including the peace process, changes in Israel-Diaspora relations, and the liberalization of the society. Countervailing forces stem mostly from the ultranationalist and Orthodox religious sectors in the society. To advance the transition, Israel will have to address four major divisions within the society: the divisions between citizens and noncitizens, Jewish and Palestinian citizens, Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, and religious and secular Jews.

Describes an action research program on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlights some social-psychological assumptions, and describes the intervention methodology and its contribution to the peace effort.

Argues that Israel is in a transitionary phase from Zionism to post-Zionism, as the original goals of Zionism have largely been accomplished. The post-Zionist Israeli state is predicted to be more committed to advancing the interests of all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity, & to become more fully integrated into the region. The status of non-Jewish Israelis is expected to improve, while the social position of non-Israeli Jews is predicted to decrease. Interests promoting & actively fighting this metamorphosis are discussed. The major cleavages in Israeli society obstructing this transition are enumerated, ie, divisions between citizens & noncitizens, Jewish & Palestinian citizens, Ashkenazi & Sephardi Jews, & religious & secular Jews. Adapted from the source document.