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A dictator's motivation for using repression is fairly clear, but why some repress more than others or favor particular types of repressive strategies is less obvious. Using statistical analysis, this article demonstrates that a dictator's reliance on co-optation fundamentally alters how repression is used. Specifically, it finds that co-optation through the use of political parties and a legislature creates incentives that lead dictators to decrease empowerment rights restrictions, like censorship, while increasing physical integrity rights violations, like torture and political imprisonment. This occurs because, by creating parties and a legislature, a dictator draws his potential opposition out of the general public and into state institutions, making it easier to identify who these opponents are, to monitor their activities, and to gauge the extent of their popular support. This reduces the need to impose broad types of repressive measures, like empowerment rights restrictions, that breed discontent within the overall population. At the same time, co-optation creates the risk that rivals, once co-opted, will use their positions within the system to build their own bases of support from which to seek the dictator's overthrow, generating incentives for dictators to increase physical integrity violations to limit the threat posed by these individuals.

The article discusses the failures of autocratic governments and dictators in relation to mass uprisings and military coups. Topics include international cooperation in promoting democratization of autocracies, the effectiveness of revolts and revolutions, and the impact of violence on potential democratization after a regime change. Also addressed are the role of regime elites in the stability of autocracies, the role of mass demonstrations in promoting democratization, and the impact of foreign aid on autocracies.

The article discusses the role of pseudo-democratic institutions in the resilience of autocratic regimes. According to the authors, authoritarian governments have become more skilled at manipulating these institutions since the end of the Cold War, leading to longer-lasting dictatorships. It is suggested that the legalization of opposition political parties and their incorporation into legislative bodies and regular elections can often be a sign of autocratic entrenchment rather than genuine political liberalization. Other topics include legitimacy, resource allocation, and international pressure.

A dictator's motivation for using repression is fairly clear, but why some repress more than others or favor particular types of repressive strategies is less obvious. Using statistical analysis, this article demonstrates that a dictator's reliance on co-optation fundamentally alters how repression is used. Specifically, it finds that co-optation through the use of political parties and a legislature creates incentives that lead dictators to decrease empowerment rights restrictions, like censorship, while increasing physical integrity rights violations, like torture and political imprisonment. This occurs because, by creating parties and a legislature, a dictator draws his potential opposition out of the general public and into state institutions, making it easier to identify who these opponents are, to monitor their activities, and to gauge the extent of their popular support. This reduces the need to impose broad types of repressive measures, like empowerment rights restrictions, that breed discontent within the overall population. At the same time, co-optation creates the risk that rivals, once co-opted, will use their positions within the system to build their own bases of support from which to seek the dictator's overthrow, generating incentives for dictators to increase physical integrity violations to limit the threat posed by these individuals.

Examining the role of personalist political parties, or parties that exist primarily to further their leader's career as opposed to promote a specific policy platform, and using original data capturing levels of personalism, this book shows that the rise of personalist parties around the globe is facilitating the decline of democracy.

Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes provides a broad, accessible overview of the key institutions and political dynamics in democracies and dictatorships, enabling students to assess the benefits and risks associated with democracy, and the growing challenges to it. Comprehensive coverage of the full spectrum of political systems enhances students' understanding of the relevance of contemporary global trends, including the nature of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence, the rise of populism and identity politics, and the impact of cultural and socio-economic drivers of democracy. Each chapter features a broad range of case studies complemented by boxes that illustrate key terms, ensuring relevant research is translated in a clear, engaging format for students.This text is supported by a range of online resources, to encourage deeper engagement with the subject matter.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Boxes and Tables -- Acknowledgements -- PART I UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT -- 1 Setting the Stage: What Is Development? -- What is the developing world? -- What is development? -- How is development measured? -- What is the role of the global forces? -- Bringing in the state -- A roadmap -- 2 Theories of Development: Why Are Some Countries Underdeveloped? -- Modernization theory -- Structuralism and the Dependency School -- Theories of growth in practice -- Conclusion: where we stand today -- 3 Debates on the State and Development -- Government intervention in the economy -- Neo-liberal economic philosophy: early influences -- The rise of neo-liberalism in the 20th century -- Neo-liberalism in economic policy -- Neo-liberalism in practice -- State-led growth in practice -- Conclusion -- 4 Institutions and Development -- Institutions in theory -- Administrative institutions -- Judicial institutions -- Political institutions -- Security institutions -- Conclusion -- PART II D EVELOPMENT TRAPS AND HURDLES -- 5 Poverty Traps -- Poverty -- Poverty and development: poverty traps -- Poverty and the state -- Dealing with poverty: a focus on agriculture -- Conclusion -- 6 Intractable Instability -- Instability -- Instability and development -- Dealing with instability -- Conclusion -- 7 Corruption -- Corruption -- Corruption and development -- Corruption and the state -- Dealing with corruption -- Conclusion -- 8 Colonialism and Geography -- Colonialism -- Colonialism and development -- Geography -- Geography and development -- Colonialism, geography and the state -- Dealing with a colonial heritage -- Conclusion -- 9 Debt and Financial Crises -- Debt -- Debt and development -- Debt and the state -- Dealing with debt -- Conclusion -- 10 Natural Disasters and Natural Resources -- Natural disasters.

The resource curse and authoritarianism in the Caspian petro-states / Indra Overland, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Heidi Kjaernet -- Resource nationalism in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector : curse or blessing? / Adil Nurmakov -- Petroleum-fuelled public investment in Azerbaijan : implications for competitiveness and employment / Ramil Maharramov -- Displacement in a booming economy : IDPs in Azerbaijan / Heidi Kjaernet -- Natural gas and authoritarianism in Turkmenistan / Gregory Gleason -- China, energy security and Central Asian diplomacy : bilateral and multilateral approaches / Marc Lanteigne -- In the 'new Great Game', who is getting played? : Chinese investment in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector / Ryan Kennedy -- Just good friends : Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's energy relations with Russia / Indra Overland, Stina Torjesen -- Azerbainjani-Russian relations and the economization of foreign policy / Heidi Kjaernet -- The Shanghai Cooperation Energy Club : purpose and prospects / Nargis Kassenova -- Conclusions and further reflections : the logic of authoritarianism in the Caspian petro-states / Indra Overland, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Heidi Kjaernet

Analyzes the nexus of petroleum, security and governance in three semi-authoritarian states in the Caspian region, linking the analysis of domestic and international issues. This book offers an analysis of the impact of oil on the development of this crucial region.