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Surveys on tax compliance and non-compliance often rely on ad hoc formulated items which lack standardization and empirical validation. We present an inventory to assess tax compliance and distinguish between different forms of compliance and non-compliance: voluntary versus enforced compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. First, items to measure voluntary and enforced compliance, avoidance, and evasion were drawn up (collected from past research and newly developed), and tested empirically with the aim of producing four validated scales with a clear factorial structure. Second, findings from the first analyses were replicated and extended to validation on the basis of motivational postures. A standardized inventory is provided which can be used in surveys in order to collect data which are comparable across research focusing on self-reports. The inventory can be used in either of two ways: either in its entirety, or by applying the single scales independently, allowing an economical and fast assessment of different facets of tax compliance.

Zusammenfassung: Insgesamt 109 (Ehe)paare, berufstätige Frauen und Männer, beantworteten einen Fragebogen über die Aufteilung der Arbeit zu Hause und die wöchentliche Berufsarbeit, sowie über die Gerechtigkeit und Zufriedenheit mit der Verteilung der Arbeit zu Hause. Weiters wurden Beziehungszufriedenheit, Rollenorientierung, Referenzperson im Vergleich zwischen eigenen Beiträgen zur Arbeit zu Hause und jenen des Partners und soziodemographische Daten erfragt. Die Ergebnisse der Studie weisen darauf hin, daß Frauen und Männer ungleich viel Zeit für die Arbeit zu Hause aufwenden, aber die Aufteilung als gerecht erleben, wenngleich Frauen eher unzufrieden sind als Männer. Während Gerechtigkeitsurteile der Frauen mit der erlebten Anrechtsverletzung und der Beziehungszufriedenheit, sowie tendenziell mit Rollenorientierung und Kompensationsmöglichkeiten durch Berufsarbeit korrelieren, ist das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden der Männer nur von der Anwesenheit von Kindern im Haushalt beeinflußt. Die Zufriedenheit mit der Aufteilung der Hausarbeit korreliert vor allem mit der erlebten Gerechtigkeit.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship of inheritance tax behavior with normative value principles and factors found relevant for income tax compliance. Also, it examines the influence of affectedness and earmarking on inheritance tax compliance. Furthermore, it compares two countries similar in tax morale, tax culture as well as dominant normative value principles, Austria and Germany, of which one – Germany – levies inheritance taxes and the other – Austria – is debating its reintroduction.Design/methodology/approachA two (affected vs nonaffected) by two (Austria vs Germany) by two (inheritance tax vs stock profit tax) by three (no earmarking vs social justice earmarking vs equality of opportunity earmarking) experimental online questionnaire was conducted with 296 Austrians and 230 Germans.FindingsNormative value principles and other socio-psychological variables play an important role concerning inheritance tax behavior. Affectedness does not influence inheritance tax compliance. Earmarking inheritance tax to projects corresponding to these value principles increases inheritance tax compliance in the Austrian sample and could represent a measure to increase inheritance tax compliance in countries implementing inheritance tax or increasing inheritance tax.Originality/valueThis study draws a comprehensive picture of the socio-psychological variables relevant to inheritance tax behavior and tests the effect of earmarking as a policy measure to increase inheritance tax compliance.

This article works towards developing a general theory of tax practice by identifying the type of individuals who provide tax services and examining the nature of the fragmented market in which they operate. The empirical studies in the tax practitioner literature have been considered with a view to determining what exactly tax practitioners do and how they interact and deal with the persons on whose behalf they work. This is done with a view to developing a conceptual analysis of their work. Negotiation theory (Wall, 1985) is then posited as a general theory that fits many aspects of tax practitioners and their work, when analysed in this way.

AbstractHow can governments get individuals and firms to pay taxes, especially given increasing tax base erosion via tax evasion, tax avoidance, and money laundering? In this paper we discuss the many different perspectives to explain why people pay – and do not pay – their taxes, especially perspectives based on "responsive regulation," and we use then these perspectives to suggest policies that governments may use to improve tax collections. We first describe an approach that is based on a single individual pursuing a single motivation by choosing a single method (tax evasion) and operating in a single country. This perspective has generated important insights, but it nonetheless has significant limitations. As a result, we then argue that this perspective must be expanded to include additional actors in the field, all pursuing additional motivations. We also expand our discussion to include additional methods of tax base erosion like tax avoidance and money laundering, as well as additional countries. We argue that explaining behavior and then devising appropriate policies requires incorporating all of these additional considerations. We also discuss the likely impact of technological innovations both on the ability of governments to collect taxes and on the ability of private agents to reduce their taxes. An important contribution of our paper is that we simulate the effects of all of these expansions to the basic model using a novel agent‐based model that is fully grounded in theory and calibrated for 33 European economics. We use this model to simulate the impacts over time of various reforms, especially reforms that implement international information‐sharing programs, by comparing tax base erosion in the absence of these reforms to erosion in their presence. Our simulation results demonstrate the importance of using a fully specified theoretical model that goes well beyond the standard economics of crime approach when considering the effects of government policy innovations. We conclude with recommendations that can in principle reduce tax base erosion via evasion, avoidance, and money laundering in the current multi‐dimensional environment as derived from the responsive regulation framework. However, these recommendations require a firm commitment from governments to their tax administrations, and these recommendations also cannot be introduced unilaterally by a single country but require international cooperation, especially via information sharing across borders.

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism‐cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.

Taxpayers' willingness to cooperate with the state and its institutions, in general, and their willingness to pay taxes, in particular, depend on a variety of variables. While economists stress the relevance of external variables such as tax rate, income, and probability of audits and severity of fines, psychological research shows that internal variables are of similar importance. We present a comprehensive review on the relevance of citizens' knowledge of tax law, their attitudes toward the government and taxation, personal norms, perceived social norms and fairness, as well as motivational tendencies to comply, and discuss possibilities for strategic intervention to increase tax compliance.