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It is widely held that an adequate theory of political obligation must be general; that is, it must establish requirements to obey the law for all or virtually all members of a given population. In regard to the principle of fairness (or fair play), generality poses a challenge, because many people claim not to want or to accept major benefits provided by the state. However, because the most important state benefits are public goods and so received even if they are not accepted, the implications of not accepting these benefits differ from those of not accepting excludable goods. Because of complex psychological aspects of rejecting non-excludable goods, rejecting such benefits frees recipients of obligations they would otherwise have only if they can pass an 'alternative test', and so explain how they would manage if rejection of the benefits actually prevented their receipt. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely held that an adequate theory of political obligation must be general; that is, it must establish requirements to obey the law for all or virtually all members of a given population. In regard to the principle of fairness (or fair play), generality poses a challenge, because many people claim not to want or to accept major benefits provided by the state. However, because the most important state benefits are public goods and so received even if they are not accepted, the implications of not accepting these benefits differ from those of not accepting excludable goods. Because of complex psychological aspects of rejecting non-excludable goods, rejecting such benefits frees recipients of obligations they would otherwise have only if they can pass an 'alternative test', and so explain how they would manage if rejection of the benefits actually prevented their receipt.

Current scholars generally view political obligations as "content independent." Citizens have moral reasons to obey the law because it is the law, rather than because of the content of different laws. However, this position is subject to criticism on both theoretical and practical grounds. The main consideration in favor of content independence, the so-called "self-image of the state," does not actually support it. Properly understood, the state's self-image is to comply with laws because of the underlying moral reasons that justify them, rather than because they are laws. Because content independence has played a central role in the widespread belief that a suitable theory of political obligation is not possible, rejecting it allows the possibility of a theory that establishes moral requirements for virtually all citizens to behave in accordance with virtually all laws, although these requirements are particular to different laws, and subjects are not required to obey them because they are laws.