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"Bargains are a fact of political life. But if bargaining inevitably involves asymmetric power, can it ever be just? Drawing on an analogy to the private law of contracts and on case studies across arenas of civic life, Democratic Deals shows that, subject to proper limits, bargaining can secure political equality and protect fundamental interests."--

"Bargains are a fact of political life. But if bargaining inevitably involves asymmetric power, can it ever be just? Drawing on an analogy to the private law of contracts and on case studies across arenas of civic life, Democratic Deals shows that, subject to proper limits, bargaining can secure political equality and protect fundamental interests."--

Legitimacy and self-determination / Anna Stilz -- In defense of functionalism / Jonathan Quong -- Is political legitimacy worth promoting? / Amanda R. Greene -- The sovereign and the republic : a republican view of political obligation / Ekow N. Yankah -- Political legitimacy under epistemic constraints : why public reasons matter / Fabienne Peter -- Legitimacy as a right to err / Daniel Viehoff -- Official intentions and political legitimacy : the case of the travel ban / Micah Schwartzman -- The political legitimacy of international NGOs / Jennifer C. Rubenstein -- Evaluating consensual models of governance : legitimacy-based law / Tom R. Tyler -- On the empirical measurement of legitimacy / Jeffrey A. Lenowitz -- The empirical study of legitimate authority : normative guidance for positive analysis / Sanford C. Gordon and Gregory A. Huber -- Trustworthy government and legitimating beliefs / Margaret Levi.

An in-depth political, legal, and philosophical study into the implications of wealth inequality in modern societies.Wealth, and specifically its distribution, has been a topic of great debate in recent years. Calls for justice against corporations implicated in the 2008 financial crash; populist rallying against "the one percent"; distrust of the influence of wealthy donors on elections and policy—all of these issues have their roots in a larger discussion of how wealth operates in American economic and political life. In Wealth a distinguished interdisciplinary group of scholars in political science, law and philosophy address the complex set of questions that relate to economic wealth and its implications for social and political life in modern societies. The volume thus brings together a range of perspectives on wealth, inequality, capitalism, oligarchy, and democracy. The essays also cover a number of more specific topics including limitarianism, US Constitutional history, the wealth defense industry, slavery, and tax policy. Wealth offers analysis and prescription including original assessment of existing forms of economic wealth and creative policy responses for the negative implications of wealth inequality. Economic wealth and its distribution is a pressing issue and this latest installment in the NOMOS series offers new and thought provoking insights

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. In The Priority of Democracy, Jack Knight and James Johnson systematically explore the subject and make a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics--and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? Knight and Johnson explore how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. They conclude that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made--even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. Knight and Johnson argue that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, Knight and Johnson suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. In The Priority of Democracy, Jack Knight and James Johnson systematically explore the subject and make a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics--and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets?

Contemporary political science takes bargaining to be the central mechanism of democratic decision making, though political theorists typically doubt that processes that permit the exercise of unequal power and the use of threats can yield legitimate outcomes. In this review, we trace the development of theories of institutional bargaining from the standpoint of pluralism and positive political theory before turning to the treatment of bargaining in the influential work of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Their ambivalence about bargaining gave rise to a new focus on the value of negotiation and compromise but this literature constitutes an unstable midpoint between the justificatory ambitions of deliberative democracy and the desire to provide plausible models of political decision making. Instead of advocating changes in mindset or motivation, we argue that a fair bargaining process requires institutional reform, as well as a justificatory framework centered on the preservation of egalitarian decision making.

AbstractWe aim to cast doubt on the now conventional distinction between "positive" and "normative political theory by shifting the burden of argument. We do not claim it is impossible to categorically differentiate political theory into "positive" and "normative" varieties. We do suggest the most familiar, extant strategies for approaching that task are implausible. We hope in the process to show that there are perfectly good reasons to set the task aside as counterproductive.

Among political scientists, not only is it uncontroversial to say that judges seek to etch their political values into law; it would be near heresy to suggest otherwise. And yet this article does just that because research conducted by scholars (mostly outside of political science) has demonstrated that the policy goal is not the only motivation; it may not even be dominant for many judges. The evidence is now so strong that it poses a serious challenge to the extremely (un)realist(ic) conception of judicial behavior that has dominated the study of law and legal institutions for generations. In addition to reviewing this evidence, we offer a more realistic conception of judicial motivations and suggest how different approaches to the study of courts can contribute to this new avenue of research.

Among political scientists, not only is it uncontroversial to say that judges seek to etch their political values into law; it would be near heresy to suggest otherwise. And yet this article does just that because research conducted by scholars (mostly outside of political science) has demonstrated that the policy goal is not the only motivation; it may not even be dominant for many judges. The evidence is now so strong that it poses a serious challenge to the extremely (un)realist(ic) conception of judicial behavior that has dominated the study of law and legal institutions for generations. In addition to reviewing this evidence, we offer a more realistic conception of judicial motivations and suggest how different approaches to the study of courts can contribute to this new avenue of research. Adapted from the source document.

Politics reflects a seemingly incontrovertible condition—any imaginable human population is diverse across multiple, overlapping dimensions including material interests, moral and ethical commitments, and cultural attachments. Such diversity means, in turn, that disagreement and conflict are unavoidable. Under these circumstances politics largely consists in contests over the contours of shared institutional arrangements. Given that there almost always are a number of ways to institutionalize social interaction, any population occupying the circumstances of politics must determine which institutional form or arrangement to rely on in any particular domain. The "priority" of democracy, on our account, derives from its usefulness in approaching this crucial task. This priority derives from features that are, in our view, unique to democracy, namely a level of reflexivity that distinguishes it from other ways of coordinating ongoing social interaction. As we demonstrate, much of the literature on social institutions tacitly and improperly privileges a quite different component of our institutional arrangements, namely markets. We show that once one clarifies the premises and argumentative strategies common to this literature, it simply is not possible to sustain the privilege it accords to markets. In fact, we argue that the analytical models and explanatory strategies that institutionalists deploy actually sustain our case for the priority of democracy.

Much current work in the social sciences seeks to understand the effects of trust and social capital on economic and political outcomes. However, the sources of trust remain unclear. In this article, the authors articulate a basic theory of the relationship between institutions and trust. The authors apply this theory to industrial districts, geographically concentrated areas of small firm production, which involve extensive cooperation in the production process. Changes in power relations affect patterns of production;the authors suggest that they also have knock-on consequences for trust and cooperation among actors.