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Empowerment of state leaders has been apparent over the last decades in various parliamentary democracies. Signs of this development, often labelled 'presidentialisation', have been reported in the executive sphere also in Sweden and Denmark in recent years. Few accounts have been made of developments in Norway. This article studies Norwegian cabinets for the last 25 years in light of the so‐called 'presidentalisation thesis'. The article finds no clear tendency of prime ministers appointing more weak and controllable ministers, or more frequently making reshuffles in cabinet, as one would expect from the presidentialisation thesis. However, the Prime Minister's Office has been clearly strengthened, suggesting that the prime ministers' ability to coordinate cabinet policy has increased.

AbstractHow is government affected by including populists in a governing coalition? We investigate if populist political parties behave 'normally' when they attain power, or if they govern differently from mainstream political parties. Empirically, we use survey data from 282 ministerial advisers from three cabinets in Norway. Our conclusion is that populists govern normally on some governance dimensions and exceptionally on others. Populists in office had ample professional experience, adhered to collegial decision making and thought the bureaucracy delivered quality and was politically responsive – on a par with the non-populists. However, populists differed from non-populist politicians in their contact patterns and their communicative concerns. That populists in this context belong to a party with a long history of parliamentary representation (Norway's Progress Party) suggests elements of exceptionalism are things one should expect to find in practically all populist parties that attain power.

Ministerial advisors have become an essential aspect of executive branches worldwide, thus making the ministerial advisor office a potential route for young politicians aspiring to an expanding political class. The article studies which professions ministerial advisors migrate to following their ministerial careers, how ministerial advisors' post-ministerial careers compare to their pre-ministerial careers, and if the variance in careers can be explained by the resources that ministerial advisors obtain while in government. Empirically, the article draws on a cohort of 139 ministerial advisors in Norwegian governments between 2001 and 2009; it covers positions in the political sphere and the public, private and voluntary occupational sectors over a period from each ministerial advisor's youth to the end of 2017. The bibliographic data are combined with surveys and elite interviews. The results show that more than expanding the political class as a recruitment ground for future Members of the Parliament and ministers, ministerial advisor appointments serve as stepping-stones to careers outside of politics. Most ministerial advisors experience shifts between occupational sectors and upwards to higher positions. However, ministerial advisors' attractiveness in the labour market is surprisingly unaffected by what they actually did in office; rather, it rests on resources such as insider knowledge and networks.

Ministerial advisors (MAs) have become an essential aspect of executive branches worldwide, thus making the MA office a potential route for young politicians aspiring to an expanding political class. The article studies which professions MAs migrate to following their ministerial careers, how MAs' post-ministerial careers compare to their pre-ministerial careers, and if the variance in careers can be explained by the resources that MAs obtain while in government. Empirically, the article draws on a cohort of 139 MAs in Norwegian governments between 2001 and 2009; it covers positions in the political sphere and the public, private and voluntary occupational sectors over a period from each MA's youth to the end of 2017. The bibliographic data is combined with surveys and elite interviews. The results show that more than expanding the political class as a recruitment ground for future MPs and ministers, MA appointments serve as stepping-stones to careers outside of politics. Most MAs experience shifts between occupational sectors and upward to higher positions. However, MAs' attractiveness in the labour market is surprisingly unaffected by what they actually did in office; rather, it rests on resources such as insider knowledge and networks. Keywords: Ministerial Advisors, Careers, Political Class, Revolving door, Executives