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We reply to John Duffield's critique of the Rational Design project, a special issue ofInternational Organizationthat explains the features of international institutions from a game-theoretic perspective. The project was deliberately limited to the analysis of explicit and observable institutional arrangements, and focused on the specific institutional properties of centralization, membership, scope, control, and flexibility. Its empirical contribution relies on case studies, but it is significantly amplified by the tight connections provided by a common theoretical perspective that is oriented toward testing a set of specific conjectures about institutional design. The results raise further issues of measurement and cross-case comparisons that provide valuable lessons for future work on institutional design. Although all of these research design choices are worth revisiting and questioning, as Duffield does, the initial results of the Rational Design project show that it provides a good basis from which to explore alternative research design decisions.

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach

In this article we summarize the empirical results of the Rational Design project. In general the results strongly support the Rational Design conjectures, especially those on flexibility and centralization; some findings are inconclusive (in particular, those addressing scope) or point toward a need for theoretical reformulation (in particular, the membership dimension). We also address the broader implications of the volume's findings, concentrating on several topics directly related to institutional design and its systematic study. First, we consider the trade-offs in creating highly formalized models to guide the analysis. Second, our discussion of the variable control is a step toward incorporating "power" more fully and explicitly in our analysis. We also consider how domestic politics can be incorporated more systematically into international institutional analysis. Finally, we initiate a discussion about how and why institutions change, particularly how they respond to changing preferences and external shocks. We conclude with a discussion of the forward-looking character of rational design.

Why do international institutions vary so widely in terms of such key institutional features as membership, scope, and flexibility? We argue that international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. In this article we introduce the theoretical framework of the Rational Design project. We identify five important features of institutions—membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility—and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. We draw on rational choice theory to develop a series of empirically falsifiable conjectures that explain this institutional variation. The authors of the articles in this special issue ofInternational Organizationevaluate the conjectures in specific issue-areas and the overall Rational Design approach.

In diesem Artikel werden die empirischen Ergebnisse des "Rational Design Projects" zusammengefasst. Im allgemeinen unterstützen die Resultate die Hypothesen des Projektes, v.a. jene bzgl. Flexibilität und Zentralisierung, einige Ergebnisse sind nicht überzeugend (v.a. jene bzgl. der Reichweite) oder weisen auf einen Bedarf an theoretischer Neuformulierung hin (v.a. bzgl. der Mitgliederdimension). Es werden auch die weiteren Implikationen der Ergebnisse dieses Bandes angesprochen, konzentriert auf mehrere Themenbereiche, die direkt mit der systematischen Untersuchung von institutioneller Gestaltung zusammenhängen. Zuerst werden die Dilemmas bei der Entwicklung hochformalisierter Modelle zur Anleitung der Analyse betrachtet. Zweitens führt die Diskussion der variablen Kontrolle zu einer expliziteren Berücksichtigung von "Macht" in der Analyse. Es wird auch untersucht, inwieweit Innenpolitik in der Analyse internationaler Institutionen berücksichtigt werden kann. Schliesslich wird eine Diskussion eröffnet, wie und weshalb sich Institutionen verändern, wie sie insbesondere auf einen Wandel der Präferenzen und der Schocks reagieren. Den Abschluss bildet eine Diskussion über den zukunftsorientierten Charakter des "Rational Designs". (SWP-Jns)

Warum unterscheiden sich internationale Institutionen so stark in Schlüsselmerkmalen wie z.B. Mitgliederschaft, Reichweite und Flexibilität? Es wird argumentiert, dass internationale Akteure zielgerichtet spezifische institutionelle Organisationsentscheidungen treffen, um bestimmte Kooperationsprobleme in unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern zu lösen. Dieser Artikel stellt einen theoretischen Rahmen für das "Rational Design Project" vor. Fünf wichtige Eigenschaften von Institutionen - Mitgliederschaft, Reichweite, Zentralisierung, Kontrolle und Flexiblität - werden vorgestellt und ihre Variation mittels vier unabhängiger Variablen erklärt, die unterschiedliche Kooperationsprobleme kennzeichnen: Verteilung und Anzahl der Akteure, Durchsetzung und Unsicherheit. Über Rational Choice Theory werden eine Reihe empirisch falsifizierbarer Vermutungen entwickelt, die diese institutionelle Variation erklären. Die Autoren dieses Artikels in der Sonderausgabe von "International Organization" evaluieren die Hypothesen in speziellen Zusammenhängen, sowie den gesamten "Rational Design" Ansatz.(SWP-Jns)

This provocative and compelling book contends that the explosive growth of new political states is finally coming to an end. Examining the forces that determine the emergence of new nation-states, the distinguished contributors consider a rich array of specific cases from the Middle East, Asia, North America, Europe, and Russia where pressures for new states are intense. They argue that unbalanced globalization, the disadvantages of terrorism as a tactic, and the rewards of dependent status will strongly limit further state formation. Despite these limits, there has been no sign of successful military or imperial expansion by established countries toward consolidation into fewer, larger national units. Neither aggression by regional states_such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nor intervention_such as the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, is likely to succeed. On balance, the book concludes, discontented national movements will have to find ways to exist within current geopolitical boundaries