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In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This article investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a hybrid strategy in which non-battleground states are stochastically targeted.

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size.

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size.

The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.

In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This article investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a hybrid strategy in which non-battleground states are stochastically targeted. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright.]

This article studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of `party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or `poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while `freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of `political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization.

This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity to form an alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops, military hardware, money). This paper examines "non-cooperative" alliances in which only individually rational ex ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take place, each alliance member maximizes his payoff in his respective Colonel Blotto game, given his resource constraint and player A's allocation of its endowment across the two games. No ex post transfers are enforceable. Remarkably, there are several ranges of parameters in which endogenous unilateral transfers take place within the alliance. That is, one player gives away resources to his ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers arise because they lead to a strategic shift in the common opponent's force allocation away from the set of battlefields of the player making the transfer, towards the set of battlefields of the player receiving the transfer. Our result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the combination of direct and strategic effects benefits both allies. This stands in stark contrast to the previous literature on alliances (see Sandler and Hartley, 2001), which relies on the assumption of pure or impure public goods. ; Diese Arbeit analysiert Colonel Blotto-Spiele mit mehr als zwei Spielern, die an mindestens zwei Fronten miteinander kämpfen. Spieler A kämpft gleichzeitig in zwei Colonel Blotto-Spielen mit zwei verschiedenen Kontrahenten, B1 und B2. Die Kontrahenten können vor der eigentlichen Konfliktphase eine Allianz eingehen. Das erlaubt es ihnen ihre Mengen an einer homogenen Konfliktressource (Truppen, Waffen, Geld) untereinander zu transferieren. Das Papier untersucht dabei "nicht-kooperative" Allianzen. Darunter wird verstanden, dass der Einsatz der transferierten Ressourcen auf den jeweiligen Konfliktschauplätzen von dem jeweiligen Spieler B1 bzw. B2 in seinem eigenen Interesse eingesetzt wird und Seitenzahlungen im Anschluss an die Konfliktphase ausgeschlossen sind. Es zeigt sich, dass es dennoch zu einseitigen und freiwilligen Ressourcentransfers der Spieler B1 und B2 im Vorfeld des Konflikts kommen kann, dass also beispielsweise B1 an B2 z.B. Waffen liefert, B2 diese als Geschenk akzeptiert und sich beide, B1 und B2 besser stellen. Ursache für die Besserstellung ist der strategische Effekt solcher Transfers auf das Kampfverhalten von A, der seine Kampfkraft vom Kampfgeschehen mit B1 zum Kampfgeschehen mit B2 verlagert. Das Ergebnis widerspricht den früheren Ergebnissen zu Allianzen (vgl. Sandler und Hartley, 2001), das im Kontext der privaten Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter erzielt wurde.

This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, parties have incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps between the two parties' transfers towards voter segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. Because of this dependence on relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties' optimal strategies may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective transfers. At the extreme, in the spirit of Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), we obtain "black hole" inefficiency. When the model is extended to allow for loyal voter segments and loyalty to a party is positively related to the efficiency of that party's transfers to the segment, the incentives leading to black hole inefficiency become even stronger. ; Diese Arbeit untersucht die Auswirkung von ineffizienter Umverteilungspolitk im Rahmen des Modells von Myerson (1993). Parteien versuchen, Wählersegmente für sich zu gewinnen, indem sie ihnen Transferzahlungen zusagen. Einzelne Wählersegmente unterscheiden sich in der Effizienz, mit der sich die Transferzahlungen einer bestimmten Partei in einen resultierenden Nutzengewinn für den Wähler übersetzen. Für die Parteien entsteht ein Anreiz, (stochastisch) Ressourcen hin zu Wählersegmenten zu verlagern, bei denen die Transfers von zwei verschiedenen Parteien einen relativ kleinen Unterschied in ihrem Effizienzniveau aufweisen, ungeachtet des absoluten Effizienzniveaus der Transferzahlung. Aufgrund dieser Abhängigkeit von relativen und nicht absoluten Effizienzniveaus können die Gleichgewichtsstrategien der Parteien zu großen Unterschieden zwischen der Summe der getätigten Transfers und der Summe der effektiv erhaltenen Transfers führen. Im Extremfall erhalten wir "black hole"-Ineffizienz wie in Magee, Brock und Young (1989). Eine Erweiterung des Modells um loyale Wählersegmente, bei der Loyalität zu einer Partei in positivem Bezug zur Effizienz der von dieser Partei erhaltenen Transfers steht, verstärkt die Anreize, die zu "black hole"-Ineffizienz führen.

This article studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or 'poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while 'freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of 'political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties'strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]