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Abstract: From 2009 through 2014, political protests erupted in more than 70 countries around the world, in both democracies and non-democracies. In most cases, the protests were not led by a political party or a trade union, and the protesters themselves were openly anti-institutional, mistrustful of both the market and the state, and lacked a coherent ideology. In this article, the author claims that though these "movements of mistrust" do not claim power and do not offer political alternative to the status quo, they do represent an effective strategy of citizen empowerment in the age of globalization, when the power of citizens derives mainly from their ability to disrupt.

"The crisis of globalization, triggered by the global financial crunch, took the form of a crisis of governability of the most powerful global powers. Instability within the states and not the rivalry between them defines global politics. The behavior of the most important global actors is shaped not by their efforts to manage globalization but by their efforts to manage the backlash against globalization. In such a situation, it is logical to expect that governments will aim to increase their country's level of independence and to curb the negative effects of interdependence. So, if some years ago regionalization was a strategy for building a more global world, now it is perceived as an alternative to it. The paradox of power in this world is that the more successful you are in reducing your vulnerability to the outside, the less powerful you are. In this environment of shifting balances - from external to internal - it is the capacity to find your place in the international system while keeping political and social stability at home that will be the best manifestations of one's power or weakness." (author's abstract)

"The financial crisis should force us into re-thinking the very meaning of power in the modern interdependent world. While in the last two decades European policy makers were focused on the notion of 'soft power' - the power to inspire others and become a model for them, the crisis forces Europe to pay attention to two important new aspects. First, it seems now that some of the key features of the European model that we tend to view as universal - post-sovereign, secular, de-militarized - are more a European exception. In a situation of economic decline Europe's role in the world will depend not only on its values, but also on its hard power. And secondly, the comparison between the way the markets reacted to the debt crisis of the US and the debt crisis in some EU member states makes us believe that in the globalized interdependent world power is not simply the capacity to inspire and lead by example, but also the capacity to spill your problems onto others. While many security experts are over-optimistic that the crisis and the new decline in defense funding will almost automatically lead to more sharing and will open chances for a more effective CSDP, our analysis points towards the opposite trend. In our analysis if there is a lack of brave political leadership, Europe risks ending up with lower defense budgets, nationalization of the foreign and defense policies as a result of electoral pressures and the marginalization of the EU as a global power." (author's abstract)

Abstract:
Once we acknowledge that disintegration of the EU is a "thinkable" option, it becomes important to grasp what "the collapse of the Union" would mean. How can the "disintegration" of the Union be defined or conceptualized? Would the departure of just one country from the eurozone or from the EU itself amount to "disintegration"? Contrary to the expectations of some democratic theorists, the EU will not collapse because of the "democratic deficit" of European institutions. Nor will it be saved by the democratic mobilization of civil society. Paradoxically, it is widespread disillusionment with democracy—the shared belief that national governments are powerless in the face of global markets—that may be the best hope for reconciling the growing tension between the goal of further European integration and the goal of deepening democracy in Europe.

Der Verfasser argumentiert, dass die Unzufriedenheit mit der Demokratie ein wesentlicher Faktor der europäischen Krise ist. Die Verheißungen demokratischer Politik hatten einen großen Anteil am Untergang politischer Gebilde im 20. Jahrhundert; das Streben nach nationaler Selbstbestimmung und der Wunsch nach individueller Freiheit waren kritische Faktoren beim Zusammenbruch des Habsburgerreichs, der Sowjetunion und Jugoslawiens. Die Krise der Europäischen Union ist anderer Natur. Die Versprechen der Politik sind gebrochen. Viele Bürger sind von der Demokratie, wie sie heute praktiziert wird, enttäuscht. Auch wenn die meisten sich nicht von undemokratischen Alternativen angezogen fühlen, gibt es doch einen wachsenden Konsens, dass demokratische Regierungen nicht die Macht haben, die Gewalten des globalen Marktes zu zähmen. In den letzten Jahren hat man in den meisten Ländern der Union, den angestammten wie den neu hinzugekommenen, eine Abnahme der politischen Beteiligung erlebt. Das Interesse der Menschen an Wahlen geht zurück, sie treten keinen politischen Parteien mehr bei, ihr Vertrauen in demokratische Institutionen hat nachgelassen. Die größte politische Lethargie findet sich dabei in den am meisten benachteiligten Gruppen der Gesellschaft - bei den Armen und den Einwanderern - jenen, die doch theoretisch das größte Interesse haben sollten, mithilfe der Politik ihr Leben zu verbessern. So bleibt das Modell der Demokratie zwar unangefochten, doch immer mehr Bürger kehren ihm den Rücken zu. (ICB2)

Once we acknowledge that disintegration of the EU is a "thinkable" option, it becomes important to grasp what "the collapse of the Union" would mean. How can the "disintegration" of the Union be defined or conceptualized? Would the departure of just one country from the eurozone or from the EU itself amount to "disintegration"? Contrary to the expectations of some democratic theorists, the EU will not collapse because of the "democratic deficit" of European institutions. Nor will it be saved by the democratic mobilization of civil society. Paradoxically, it is widespread disillusionment with democracy -- the shared belief that national governments are powerless in the face of global markets -- that may be the best hope for reconciling the growing tension between the goal of further European integration and the goal of deepening democracy in Europe. Adapted from the source document.

This essay is one of ten in a special journal issue discussing a 2002 article, "Power and Weakness" by Robert Kagan, which assessed the structural underpinnings of foreign relations between the United States and Europe. Kagan's observations formed a double argument: First, that the relative power of the United States and the relative weakness of Europe frame the way Americans and Europeans approach international politics; and second, that ideas about the efficacy of power also shape the extent to which one pursues and uses it. Adapted from the source document.

The central political paradox of the times is that the factors that contributed to the success of democracy are the ones that threaten it today. The crisis of trust in democratic institutions in Europe is the outcome not of the failure of the democratisation of European societies but of its success. The question is no longer how elites can regain the trust of the people; the question is how a liberal democracy can function in an environment in which the elites will be permanently mistrusted, regardless of what they do or how transparent the mechanisms of governing are.

Der Autor untersucht Russlands "gelenkte Demokratie" als exemplarischen Fall eines neuen Typus von Autokratie unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung: Die Autokratien des 21. Jahrhunderts sind gemäßigt repressiv, kapitalistisch und in die Weltwirtschaft integriert, auf den Ruinen der traditionellen Gesellschaft errichtet, nicht ideologisch und funktionieren trotz offener Grenzen und eines freien Informationsflusses. Die These des Autors lautet: Gerade das widersprüchliche Wesen von Russlands Autokratie - die stabil und dysfunktional zugleich ist - lässt uns besser verstehen, warum die Autokratie im Zeitalter der Demokratisierung überlebt und warum es so schwer ist, sich heutigen Autokratien zu widersetzen. (ICB2)