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AbstractAs emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institutions adapt to underlying global power shifts? We propose an (institutionalist) theory of strategic co-optation that differs from both (realist) accommodationist and (liberal) integrationist theories. Drawing on isolated treatments of strategic co-optation from other domains – domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present – we develop a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to shifts in the global distribution of power. The theory specifies the concept, the conditions and the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We conceptualize co-optation as a specific form of adaptation where established powers trade institutional privileges for emerging powers' institutional support. We theorize the conditions under which emerging and established powers are (more or less) likely to strike a co-optation deal. In addition, we identify endogenous dynamics that may render co-optation precarious and thus subject to instabilities. While the ambition of this paper is primarily theoretical, we provide various empirical illustrations of how strategic co-optation is used to adapt international institutions to contemporary shifts in the global distribution of power.

Internationale Organisationen mit globaler oder regionaler Reichweite (z.B. UN, IWF, Weltbank, WTO, EU) spielen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle bei der Schaffung und Implementierung von internationalen Normen und Regeln, mithin bei Global Governance. Die Sicherheit, das ökonomische Wohlergehen, der Schutz der Menschenrechte und die ökologischen Lebensbedingungen von Menschen weltweit werden von der Fähigkeit bzw. Unfähigkeit internationaler Organisationen, Kooperation und Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates möglich zu machen und zu stabilisieren, beeinflusst. Das Lehrbuch will die Leserin bzw. den Leser daher theoretisch informiert und empirisch fundiert mit den Entstehungsbedingungen, der Entwicklung, Funktionsweise und den Tätigkeiten internationaler Organisationen vertraut machen. Es führt in die wichtigsten Theorien über internationale Organisationen ein und bietet einen historischen Überblick über internationale Organisationen in verschiedenen Politikfeldern. Das Lehrbuch analysiert ferner die Akteure, Strukturen und Prozesse, die die Entscheidungsfindung in internationalen Organisationen prägen. Schließlich werden die Tätigkeiten eines breiten Spektrums internationaler Organisationen und deren Beitrag zur kooperativen Bearbeitung grenzüberschreitender Probleme in den Sachbereichen "Sicherheit", "Wirtschaft", "Umwelt" und "Menschenrechte" untersucht.Der Inhalt· Theorie und Geschichte internationaler Organisationen· Politikentwicklungsprozesse in internationalen Organisationen· Politikfeldaktivitäten internationaler OrganisationenDie ZielgruppePolitikwissenschaftler; Studierende und Dozenten der Politikwissenschaft.Die AutorenProf. Dr. Volker Rittberger (†) lehrte Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Tübingen.Prof. Dr. Bernhard Zangl lehrt Politikwissenschaft (insbesondere Internationale Beziehungen und Global Governance) an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.Andreas Kruck ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.

Prevailing power transition theories focus on hard sources of power to explain why international institutions do, or do not, adapt to shifts in the balance of power among their members. This article argues that, in the wake of such a shift in the balance between emerging and established powers, institutional adaptations depend on both their hard and soft power resources. Soft power matters for institutional adaptations because both emerging and established powers have to justify the use of hard power to their respective audiences. Whether emerging or established powers are able to use the hard power they have depends crucially on rhetorical resources, such as claims of legitimacy and their (transnational) societal resonance. We provide empirical support for our argument through an analysis of the adaptation of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights agreement and the adaptation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa were able to bring about institutional adaptations because they not only had the hard power to undermine the respective institutions, but could also build on civil society support that legitimized their demands or constrained established states' use of hard power to fend off their demands.

Prevailing power transition theories focus on hard sources of power to explain why international institutions do, or do not, adapt to shifts in the balance of power among their members. This article argues that, in the wake of such a shift in the balance between emerging and established powers, institutional adaptations depend on both their hard and soft power resources. Soft power matters for institutional adaptations because both emerging and established powers have to justify the use of hard power to their respective audiences. Whether emerging or established powers are able to use the hard power they have depends crucially on rhetorical resources, such as claims of legitimacy and their (transnational) societal resonance. We provide empirical support for our argument through an analysis of the adaptation of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights agreement and the adaptation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa were able to bring about institutional adaptations because they not only had the hard power to undermine the respective institutions, but could also build on civil society support that legitimized their demands or constrained established states' use of hard power to fend off their demands.