Suchergebnisse

AbstractMigrant remittances, particularly when transferred through the banking system, may contribute to financial development in migrants' home countries. We analyse the determinants of the choice of transfer channel (formal services versus informal operators or personal transfers) by Moldovan migrants in 2006. We estimate a multinomial logit model from household survey data. Our explanatory variables include socio‐economic characteristics of the migrant and other household members, the pattern of migration (destination country, legal status, duration), and financial information (average amount and frequency of payments). Key reasons not to use a formal transfer channel are a migrant's emphasis on low transfer cost (rather than speed, convenience or security), irregular legal status in the host country, and short migration spells. Our findings demonstrate that migrants' transnational capacities and activities in their entirety bear upon the choice of transfer channel; any policy interventions to promote the use of formal channels should reflect this.

Diese Studie diskutiert mögliche Strategien der Entwicklungsländer bei den Verhandlungen über den internationalen Dienstleistungshandel im Rahmen der WTO-Doha- Entwicklungs-Runde. Die Liberalisierung von Dienstleistungsimporten (u.a. durch ausländische Direktinvestitionen) führt tendenziell zu höherer Angebotsqualität und niedrigeren Preisen, wenn der Wettbewerb zwischen den Anbietern intensiver wird. Dies dürfte vor allem bei Produzentendienstleistungen zutreffen (Transport, Finanzdienstleistungen, Telekommunikation). Weniger eindeutig ist die Nutzen-Kosten-Abwägung bei Infrastrukturdienstleistungen mit Netzmonopolen (Wasser- und Energieversorgung) oder wenn gesellschaftlich wünschenswerter Konsum durch Armut begrenzt wird (Gesundheitsdienstleistungen, Bildung). Schließlich werden die meisten Dienstleistungsexporte der Entwicklungsländer kaum durch Einfuhrbarrieren der Industrieländer behindert. Falls allerdings als Ergebnis der Doha-Runde die zeitlich begrenzte Arbeitsmigration aus Entwicklungsländern in Industrieländer zur Erbringung von Dienstleistungen (Erbringungsart 4 nach GATS) erleichtert würde, könnte dies erhebliche Einkommensgewinne der Entwicklungsländer nach sich ziehen. ; This paper discusses possible strategies for developing countries in negotiations on trade in services in the ongoing WTO Doha Development Round (DR). The liberalization of service imports (including through direct investment) will generate benefits through higher quality, lower prices, and better access mainly if competition among suppliers is enhanced. This is typically the case for producer services, such as domestic and international transport, financial services, and telecommunications. By contrast, the rationale for import liberalization is less clear for consumer or infrastructure services with network monopolies (such as water or energy distribution) or when demand is constrained by poverty (health care, education). In such cases, carefully calibrated government policies, possibly with international donor support, may be required to achieve a socially optimal level of supply. Finally, most service exports by developing countries face few import barriers in industrialized countries. However, under the GATS, service exports could also be delivered through temporary movement of natural persons. If Doha Development Round negotiations were to increase opportunities for temporary labor migration, the benefits to developing countries could be large.

Several developments in international trade in services impact strongly on developing countries: First, the world-wide diffusion of information technologies (IT) has created new export opportunities for developing countries in IT services. Second, the recently proclaimed Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction can only be attained if key services are provided more efficiently in developing countries - particularly through the liberalization of service imports. Third, in the ongoing Doha Development Round (DR) of trade negotiations, developing countries are asked to formally commit to liberalizing their service imports under the terms of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Developing countries will benefit from liberalizing service imports if liberalization enhances competition on the supply side. This is typically the case for producer services, such as domestic and international transport, financial services, and telecommunications. The lifting of restrictions on the market access by foreigners (including through direct investment) will often improve service quality or lower prices and thereby enhance the international competitiveness of downstream industries. In Doha Development Round negotiations, therefore, developing countries may find it useful to commit to liberalizing imports of producer services. By contrast, the benefits of import liberalization are less clear for some consumer services where supply is subject to network monopolies (e.g., water and energy distribution) or demand is constrained by poverty (health care, education). Here, achieving a socially optimal level of supply may require carefully calibrated government policies, possibly with international donor support. For developing countries, such sectors should not be priority areas for commitments on service imports under the GATS. Most service exports by developing countries, especially IT services transmitted electronically, face few import barriers in industrialized countries. However, under the GATS, service exports may also be delivered through temporary movement of natural persons, e.g., developing country nationals working in industrialized countries without becoming residents there. If Doha Development Round negotiations were to increase opportunities for such temporary labor migration, the benefits to developing countries could be huge.

The paper discusses the costs and benefits to be expected by least-developed and low-income ("vulnerable") economies if they accede to the WTO, the impact of current debates about WTO reform on vulnerable economies, and measures to make it easier for vulnerable economies to accede to and actively participate in the WTO. The main conclusion is that the benefits from WTO membership in terms of improved market access for traditional exports are likely to be limited. However, by submitting a wide range of trade-related policies to international scrutiny and by entering into binding commitments on the conduct of these policies, reform-oriented governments in vulnerable economies can make it more likely that their reforms will be successful.

For many applicant countries, accession to the WTO has been, and still is, a frustratingly slow process. In this paper, we discuss the substantial, contentious issues that are slowing down progress in accession negotiations. We contrast these with the benefits of WTO accession not only to the applicant countries, but also to the multilateral trading system as a whole and, hence, to current members. Against this background, we suggest a strategy to accelerate accession without diluting the ground rules of the multilateral trading system.

Vor dem Reformprozeß hatte sich die Sowjetunion weitgehend vom Weltmarkt abgekoppelt. Gleichzeitig gab es ein eng geknüpftes Netz interregionaler Lieferverflechtungen über die Grenzen der Republiken hinweg. Mit der politischen Desintegration traten Eigeninteressen der ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken in den Vordergrund. Die direkten Transfers entfielen sofort. Die Preise im zwischen staatlichen Handel wurden dem Weltmarktniveau angepaßt,was zu verschärften Zahlungsproblemen führte und zum Einbruch im Handel zwischen den Nachfolgestaaten bis hin zur Auflösung der Rubelzone. Dieser Zusammenbruch beeinflußte auch das Volumen und die Struktur des Handels der Nachfolgestaaten mit Drittländern. Exportiert werden mittlerweile meist nur noch Rohstoffe und rohstoffnahe Güter, bei deren Produktion man weitgehend ohne Vorleistungen aus den anderen Nachfolgestaaten auskommt. Drei Jahre nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion ist der regionalen Desintegration noch keine weltwirtschaftliche Integration gefolgt. Die gründe hierfür liegen vornehmlich bei den Nachfolgestaaten selbst, die eine vielfach inkonsistente Transformationspolitik betreiben. Aber auch die OECD-Staaten erschweren die weltwirtschaftliche Integration, indem sie den Exporten handelspolitische Barrieren - vor allem in Form von Antidumpingverfahren und Importquoten - in den Weg stellen. Vieles spricht dafür, daß in der nahen Zukunft weiterhin Rohstoffexporte das Angebot der Nachfolgestaaten prägen werden, auch wenn im Hochtechnologiebereich und bei arbeitsintensiven Konsumgütern, wie Textilien, vereinzelt Marktchancen genutzt