Suchergebnisse

Risk and uncertainty are integral parts of modern technology, and they must be managed effectively to allow the development of reliable, high‐quality products. Because so many facets of technology and society involve risk and uncertainty, it is essential that risk management be handled in a systematic manner. Fault‐tree analysis is one of the principal methods used in the analysis of systems'safety. Its detailed and systematic deductive structure makes it a valuable tool for design and diagnostic purposes. Point probability and the minimization of the expected failure probability have, until recently, dominated fault‐tree analysis. A methodology that incorporates uncertainty analysis, conditional expected risk, and multiple objectives with fault‐tree analysis is presented. A computer software package termed the "Distribution Analyzer and Risk Evaluator (DARE) Using Fault Trees," which translates the new methodology into a working decision‐support system, is developed. DARE Using Fault Trees is a flexible computer code that is capable of analyzing the risk of the overall system in terms of the probability density function of failure probability. Emphasis is placed on the uncertainty and risk of extreme events. A comparative study between existing codes for fault‐tree analysis and DARE demonstrates the strengths of the methodology. A case study for NASA's solid rocket booster is used to perform the comparative analysis.

Single‐objective‐based decision‐tree analysis has been extensively and successfully used in numerous decision‐making problems since its formal introduction by Howard Raiffa more than two decades ago. This paper extends the traditional methodology to incorporate multiple noncommensurate objective functions and use of the conditional expected value of the risk of extreme and catastrophic events. The proposed methodology considers the cases where (a) a finite number of actions are available at each decision node and (b) discrete or continuous states of nature can be presented at each chance node. The proposed extension of decision‐tree analysis is introduced through an example problem that leads the reader step‐by‐step into the methodological procedure. The example problem builds on flood warning systems. Two noncommensurate objectives—the loss of lives and the loss of property (including monetary costs of the flood warning system)–are incorporated into the decision tree. In addition, two risk measures—the common expected value and the conditional expected value of extreme and catastrophic events—are quantified and are also incorporated into the decision‐making process. Theoretical difficulties associated with the stage‐wise calculation of conditional expected values are identified and certain simplifying assumptions are made for computational tractibility. In particular, it is revealed that decisions concerning experimentation have a very interesting impact on the noninferior solution set of options—a phenomenon that has no equivalence in the single‐objective case.

Roy pioneers the concept and practice of risk management of disastrous events via his safety‐first principle for portfolio selection. More specifically, his safety‐first principle advocates an optimal portfolio strategy generated from minimizing the disaster probability, while subject to the budget constraint and the mean constraint that the expected final wealth is not less than a preselected disaster level. This article studies the dynamic safety‐first principle in continuous time and its application in asset and liability management. We reveal that the distortion resulting from dropping the mean constraint, as a common practice to approximate the original Roy's setting, either leads to a trivial case or changes the problem nature completely to a target‐reaching problem, which produces a highly leveraged trading strategy. Recognizing the ill‐posed nature of the corresponding Lagrangian method when retaining the mean constraint, we invoke a wisdom observed from a limited funding‐level regulation of pension funds and modify the original safety‐first formulation accordingly by imposing an upper bound on the funding level. This model revision enables us to solve completely the safety‐first asset‐liability problem by a martingale approach and to derive an optimal policy that follows faithfully the spirit of the safety‐first principle and demonstrates a prominent nature of fighting for the best and preventing disaster from happening.