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AbstractThe Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in the spring of 2020 caused severe political, social, and economic turmoil throughout the world. In spite of early warning signals from the World Health Organization, countries struggled to shape their policy responses and countermeasures for curtailing the spread of the virus while also minimising the damage that any restrictions would inflict on the health and well-being of society at large. While some countries have adopted strict regulations and extraordinary measures after declaring 'states of exception' and 'national emergencies', others have relied upon expert recommendations and individual responsibility. Sweden is viewed as having adopted one of the latter type of approaches in that it places the responsibility for social distancing upon the individual. Is this an instance of a failed 'securitisation' process, or rather a sensible constitutional and political response to a severe security event? This article presents an in-depth analysis of the Swedish strategy for coping with Covid-19, arguing that this case illustrates that security management in a democratic state should direct greater attention to rule following in accordance with a logic of appropriateness rather than the rule breaking envisaged by securitisation theory.

Contemporary liberal and democratic states have 'securitized' a growing number of issues by advancing the notion of societal security. This is coupled with a proactive stance and the conception of building societal resilience in order to withstand future crises and disturbances. The preemptive logic of contemporary security and crisis management calls for a new type of resilient neoliberal subject who is willing to accept uncertainty and shoulder greater individual responsibility for her own security. This article offers a genealogical analysis of this development in Sweden since the end of the Cold War, highlighting the role now assigned to citizens within social and national security planning. I argue that seeking a return to a more traditional notion of 'total defence' blurs the previously important war/peace and crisis/security distinctions. While war preparedness in previous eras was an exceptional aspect of human life and citizenship, the conceptions of security now evolving bind together societal and national security such that civil and war preparedness are merged into an ever-present dimension of everyday existence. The analysis also reveals that the responsibilization of individuals introduces a moral dimension into security and generates new forms of citizen–citizen relations. These extricate the sovereign powers of the state and the liberalist social contract between the state and its citizens.

It is well recognized that contemporary crisis call for collaborative efforts across both organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. One of the key challenges for governments and public authorities responsible for organizing crisis management is to find adequate ways in which they can support decentralized and collaborative responses. This effort can be analyzed through the meta‐governance approach that suggests that different instruments can be used to support decentralized collaborative efforts. This article analyzes the management of crisis communication in Sweden and the implementation of a new national Security Communications System (SCS) as a specific case of meta‐governance. The main finding suggests that meta‐governance may be impaired by combining different types of governance (sovereignty, markets, or network management) due to competing rationality invested in each governance style. The deadlock was, however, resolved by direct involvement and increased deliberation between the meta‐governors and the end users as it generated a shared understanding of crisis management and the utility of a single SCS. Besides identifying the importance of direct involvement in terms of network management the article also suggests that meta‐governors need to develop a deeper and more sensitive understanding of the self‐organizing nature of networks in order to be able to support collaborative crisis management.

The aim of this article is to assess how the European Union advances its role as a global security actor and how it deploys the military forces provided by the member states. Tracing the current debate of the identity and means of the European Union, we analyze the two maritime operations, EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) and EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia) from a naval diplomacy perspective. Naval diplomacy acknowledge a more versatile role for naval forces, not just military advancement and force projection. For this purpose, we need to go beyond mission descriptions and operational mandates in order to analyze and assess the two operations from within, relying on internal reports and interviews with senior officers who have participated in the operations. Results show that naval forces seeks cooperation with International organizations, NGOs, and third countries in order to facilitate security and good order of the global common of international water. Still, complex security problems are not resolved in this manner and EU maritime operations are highly political, thus facing an uncertain future as a tool of CSDP.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing relations between individuals and public authorities within the Swedish crisis management system from 1995 to 2017. After the end of the Cold War, Sweden adopted a broader understanding of security that utilizes alternative governance strategies beyond sovereign means and focuses upon domestic security and the protection of vital systems. This has resulted in the emergence of collaborative arrangements involving public and private actors and as well as the extensive responsibilization of individuals. The latter has taken place since emergency and exceptionalism persist as vital concepts also in domestic security management. The present discussion argues that these two concepts restrict possibilities for democratizing security management and provides the means for harnessing the inclusion of volunteers while not granting them due voice in collaborative governance arrangements. However, responsibilization strategies include 'activation' which in turn may invoke critical agency and reflection as well as enable resistance toward the current apolitical notion of crisis management.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing relations between individuals and public authorities within the Swedish crisis management system from 1995 to 2017. After the end of the Cold War, Sweden adopted a broader understanding of security that utilizes alternative governance strategies beyond sovereign means and focuses upon domestic security and the protection of vital systems. This has resulted in the emergence of collaborative arrangements involving public and private actors and as well as the extensive responsibilization of individuals. The latter has taken place since emergency and exceptionalism persist as vital concepts also in domestic security management. The present discussion argues that these two concepts restrict possibilities for democratizing security management and provides the means for harnessing the inclusion of volunteers while not granting them due voice in collaborative governance arrangements. However, responsibilization strategies include 'activation' which in turn may invoke critical agency and reflection as well as enable resistance toward the current apolitical notion of crisis management.

The use of collaborations and partnerships that engage a variety of actors from both the public and private spheres has drawn attention during the last decade as a promising strategy for combatting trafficking and improving assistance to victims of trafficking. This article investigates the Swedish Civil Society Platform against Human Trafficking as an example of successful collaboration between civil society actors. The aim is to explore how the platform as a distinct organizational form is capable of dealing productively with some of the challenges facing internal and external collaboration. We utilize interviews with key actors and a study of policy documents as we argue that the modularity and flexibility of the platform organizational form are key factors in its success. While it is a robust type of organization that may be regarded as a trustworthy partner, it also permits its member organizations to continue functioning as independent entities.