Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of "Sour Grapes" Behavior
In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 33, Heft 1-2, S. 57-76
ISSN: 2366-6161
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In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 33, Heft 1-2, S. 57-76
ISSN: 2366-6161
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.
BASE
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.
BASE
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.
BASE
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.
BASE
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.
BASE
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 90-93
In: Public choice, Band 153, Heft 3, S. 269-277
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 153, Heft 3-4, S. 269-277
ISSN: 1573-7101
This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the participants of the Voting Procedures workshop in July, 2010. Among 18 voting rules, Approval Voting won the contest, and Plurality Voting received no support at all.
BASE
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Electoral Systems, S. 327-351
This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the participants of the Voting Procedures workshop in July, 2010. Among 18 voting rules, Approval Voting won the contest, and Plurality Voting received no support at all.
BASE
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Handbook on Approval Voting, S. 311-335
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Handbook on Approval Voting, S. 339-356
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Handbook on Approval Voting, S. 455-468