Suchergebnisse

This article explores how members of the House and Senate Subcommittees on Agricultural Appropriations use the appropriations process to earmark special grants for agricultural research projects without forming a majority logroll. It also shows how subcommittee members coerce the USDA into administering individual earmarked research grants even though the precise allocation of these grants does not have the force of law. This article makes an important contribution because it analyzes an institutional development within the appropriations process that has not been explored in the existing literature, and it examines the consequences that this development has had on the quality of USDA‐funded agricultural research.

"We examine three theories of Progressive Era regulation: public interest, industry capture, and information manipulation by the federal bureaucracy and muckraking press. Based on analysis of qualitative legislative histories and econometric evidence, we argue that the adoption of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act was due to all three factors. Select producer groups sought regulation to tilt the competitive playing field to their advantage. Progressive reform interests desired regulation to reduce uncertainty about food and drug quality. Additionally, rent-seeking by the muckraking press and its bureaucratic allies played a key role in the timing of the legislation. We also find that because the interests behind regulation could not shape the enforcing agency or the legal environment in which enforcement took place, these groups did not ultimately benefit from regulation in the ways originally anticipated"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site