Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific Unemployment
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2754
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2754
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Working paper
In: Limnologica: ecology and management of inland waters, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 248-254
ISSN: 1873-5851
In: JEDC-D-21-00553
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We analyze the effects of government spending in a New-Keynesian model with search and matching frictions featuring endogenous growth through learning-by-doing and skill loss from long-term unemployment. We show that medium-run and long-run output and unemployment multipliers are much larger compared to the standard model that abstracts from endogenous growth and skill loss. In our model the aggregate effect of a temporary fiscal stimulus is amplified via the skill loss channel through lower training costs. Via the learning-by-doing channel, it leads to hysteresis in human capital accumulation and thereby output. These results hold for alternative forms of fiscal financing (lump-sum tax, distortionary tax and government debt) as well as alternative labor market institutions (US and Europe).
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This paper provides a model of "social hysteresis," whereby long, deep recessions demotivate workers and thereby lead them to change their work ethic. In switching from a pro-work to an anti-work identity, their incentives to seek and retain work fall and consequently their employment chances fall. In this way, temporary recessions may come to have permanent effects on aggregate employment. We also show that these permanent effects, along with the underlying identity switches, can be avoided through stabilization policy. The size of the government expenditure multiplier can be shown to depend on the composition of identities in the workforce.
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This paper provides a model of social hysteresis whereby long, deep recessions demotivate workers and thereby lead them to change their work ethic. In switching from a pro-work to an anti-work identity, their incentives to seek and retain work fall and consequently their employment chances fall. In this way, temporary recessions may come to have permanent effects on aggregate employment. We also show that these permanent effects, along with the underlying identity switches, can be avoided through stabilization policy. The size of the government expenditure multiplier can be shown to depend on the composition of identities in the workforce.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4271
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 88-104
In: European journal of political economy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 88-104
ISSN: 1873-5703
"We analyze how firm-provided training is affected by the interaction among important institutional variables in the labor market: firing costs, minimum wages and unemployment benefits. We find that the degree of complementarity and substitutability among these variables depends on employees' abilities. Thereby the institutional interactions influence skill inequality. We derive how the influence of one of the institutional variables above is affected by other institutional variables with respect to inequality in skills arising from firm-provided training. We derive several striking results, such as: (a) the minimum wage and unemployment benefits generate increasing skill inequality whereas firing costs generate skill equalization; (b) unemployment benefits and firing costs are complements in their effects on skill inequality, (c) firing costs and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill equalization, and (d) unemployment benefits and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill inequality." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
In: European journal of political economy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 88-104
ISSN: 0176-2680
"We analyze how firm-provided training is affected by the interaction among important institutional variables in the labor market: firing costs, minimum wages and unemployment benefits. We find that the degree of complementarity and substitutability among these variables depends on employees' abilities. Thereby the institutional interactions influence skill inequality. We derive how the influence of one of the institutional variables above is affected by other institutional variables with respect to inequality in skills arising from firm-provided training. We derive several striking results, such as: (a) the minimum wage and unemployment benefits generate increasing skill inequality whereas firing costs generate skill equalization; (b) unemployment benefits and firing costs are complements in their effects on skill inequality, (c) firing costs and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill equalization, and (d) unemployment benefits and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill inequality." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku). Forschungsmethode: Theoriebildung; Grundlagenforschung.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7413
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11858
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Working paper
This paper analyzes Germany's unusual labor market experience during the Great Recession. We estimate a general equilibrium model with a detailed labor market block for post-unification Germany. This allows us to disentangle the role of institutions (short-time work, government spending rules) and shocks (aggregate, labor market, and policy shocks) and to perform counterfactual exercises. We identify positive labor market performance shocks (likely caused by labor market reforms) as the key driver for the "German labor market miracle" during the Great Recession.
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This paper analyzes Germany's unusual labor market experience during the Great Recession. We estimate a general equilibrium model with a detailed labor market block for post-unification Germany. This allows us to disentangle the role of institutions (short-time work, government spending rules) and shocks (aggregate, labor market, and policy shocks) and to perform counterfactual exercises. We identify positive labor market performance shocks (likely caused by labor market reforms) as the key driver for the "German labor market miracle" during the Great Recession.
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