The Limits of Partisan Prejudice
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 79, Heft 2, S. 485-501
ISSN: 1468-2508
53 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 79, Heft 2, S. 485-501
ISSN: 1468-2508
Partisanship increasingly factors into the behavior of Americans in both political and nonpolitical situations, yet the bounds of partisan prejudice are largely unknown. In this paper, we systematically evaluate the limits of partisan prejudice using a series of five studies situated within a typology of prejudice. We find that partisan prejudice predicts suppression of hostile rhetoric toward one's own party, avoidance of members of the opposition, and a desire for preferential treatment for one's own party. While these behaviors may cause incidental or indirect harm to the opposition, we find that even the most affectively polarized—those with the strongest disdain for the opposition—are no more likely to intentionally harm the opposition than those with minimal levels of affective polarization.
BASE
In: The journal of politics: JOP
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 825-844
ISSN: 1469-2112
Most Americans support liberal policies on the social welfare agenda, the dominant policy cleavage in American politics. Yet a striking feature of the US party system is its tendency to equilibrium. How, then, does the Republican Party minimize defection on the social welfare agenda? The results of this study illustrate a deep ideological asymmetry between the parties. Republican identifiers are ideologically aware and oriented to a degree that far exceeds their Democratic counterparts. Our investigation, which utilizes cross-sectional, longitudinal and experimental data, demonstrates the role of ideological awareness and involvement in the Republicans' ability to maintain the backing of their supporters even on issues on which the position of the Democratic Party is widely popular. It also exposes two mechanisms, party branding and the use of the status quo as a focal point, that Democrats use to retain or rally support for issues on the social welfare agenda on which the Republican Party's position is widely popular.
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 1-20
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: Political communication: an international journal, Band 39, Heft 5, S. 565-588
ISSN: 1091-7675
In: Journal of communication, Band 71, Heft 4, S. 572-597
ISSN: 1460-2466
AbstractPrevious studies generally assume that barriers to internet access are largely passive. That is, exclusion from the Internet is a consequence of poorly resourced individuals, communities, and institutions. This study complicates that assumption by focusing on the active policing and gatekeeping of internet access. Specifically, we estimate the causal effect of free Wi-Fi at chain restaurants on quality-of-life crime reporting by leveraging a staggered difference-in-differences design which compares geo-located crime reports near chain restaurants in Chicago before and after those restaurants introduced free Wi-Fi. We find that free Wi-Fi led to a substantive and significant increase in quality-of-life policing when restaurants were located in wealthier and Whiter areas, but not in other areas. Our findings suggest that internet access itself may be actively policed by social institutions, in our case, national chain restaurants and the police, to protect access for some at the expense of others.
SSRN
Working paper
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 5
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 5-20
ISSN: 1540-5907
Over the last two decades, as the number of media choices available to consumers has exploded, so too have worries over self‐selection into media audiences. Some fear greater apathy, others heightened polarization. In this article, we shed light on the latter possibility. We identify the impact of access to broadband Internet on affective polarization by exploiting differences in broadband availability brought about by variation in state right‐of‐way regulations (ROW). We merge state‐level regulation data with county‐level broadband penetration data and a large‐N sample of survey data from 2004 to 2008 and find that access to broadband Internet increases partisan hostility. The effect occurs in both years and is stable across levels of political interest. We also find that access to broadband Internet boosts partisans' consumption of partisan media, a likely cause of increased polarization.
In: Journal of experimental political science: JEPS, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 97-107
ISSN: 2052-2649
AbstractIsrael is viewed unfavorably among wide segments of the public within several European democracies, despite being regarded itself as a Western democracy. Does drawing attention to Israel's democratic attributes improve views toward Israel? In two surveys with Dutch national samples, anti-Semitic affect, low anti-Arab/Muslim affect, and left-wing political orientation independently predicted anti-Israel sentiment. However, in experiments embedded within the surveys, making salient Israel's democratic attributes had opposite effects on Israel attitude across those on the right and the left – slightly decreasing anti-Israel sentiment among those with a right-wing orientation but slightly increasing anti-Israel sentiment among those with a left-wing orientation. We discuss potential explanations grounded in social psychological theory as well as implications for the strategic communication efforts of groups seeking to influence attitudes toward Israel.
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 405-431
ISSN: 1537-5331
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, S. 1-11
ISSN: 2049-8489
Abstract
A popular explanation for America's democratic ills is that Republicans and Democrats misperceive one another to hold extreme attitudes. However, Americans may also misperceive the diversity of partisans' attitudes to ill effect. This paper uses surveys and pre-registered experiments with representative and convenience samples (n = 9405) to validate a measure of perceived attitude extremity and diversity and compare it to canonical measures of perceived polarization. We find that American partisans vastly under-estimate the diversity of each party's attitudes. Yet, contrary to existing research, we see little evidence that partisans over-estimate how extreme the "average" Republican or Democrat is. Finally, perceptions of both the "average" partisan and within-party attitude diversity predict partisan animosity and perceptions of out-party threat.
In: American journal of political science
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractWhile some assert that social identities have become more salient in American media coverage, existing evidence is largely anecdotal. An increased emphasis on social identities has important political implications, including for polarization and representation. We first document the rising salience of different social identities using natural language processing tools to analyze all tweets from 19 media outlets (2008–2021) alongside 553,078 URLs shared on Facebook. We then examine one potential mechanism: Outlets may highlight meaningful social identities—race/ethnicity, gender, religion, or partisanship—to attract readers through various social and psychological pathways. We find that identity cues are associated with increases in some forms of engagement on social media. To probe causality, we analyze 3,828 randomized headline experiments conducted via Upworthy. Headlines mentioning racial/ethnic identities generated more engagement than headlines that did not, with suggestive evidence for other identities. Identity‐oriented media coverage is growing and rooted partly in audience demand.
SSRN