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This essay takes an analytical approach to examine some Chinese science fiction narratives with the themes of climate change, terraforming, and environment degradation—written from the mid-20th century to the early years of the 21st century. My broad reading of the texts treats these narratives as archive—textual sources that document a historical development of the impact of human activities on nature. On one hand, these narratives are all closely related to the country's modernization, its economic takeoff, and the rhetoric of building a powerful China. On the other hand, they form one set of what can be understood as an emerging body of Chinese fiction located firmly within the strata and sediment of the Anthropocene. This body of literature offers a venue for explaining and exploring how economics, technological developments, and government policies have transformed the ecology, environment, and climate in the Anthropocene. These narratives also echo the concept of slow violence dubbed by Rob Nixon in 2011. These terraforming and climate narratives reveal an attritional violence of environmental degradation, climate change, and the consequential social and political problems that permeate so many of our lives. My close reading of Chen Qiufan's novel The Waste Tide ( Huangchao, 2013) specifically portrays a slow and attritional violence—namely, the ways in which the electronics recycling industry have caused severe environmental and occupational impacts on nature and humans—through exploration of the complex relationships among technology, the economy, and the environment.

Based on first-hand information obtained from Chinese and Foreign enterprises and institutions in the Chinese ICT industry, this book presents a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Chinese ICT industrial sector. It especially analyzes the strengths, weaknesses, and threats facing both the Chinese enterprise and western multinationals.

In the first systematic study of its kind, Hua-yu Li explains why, in 1953, Mao suddenly changed direction in economic policy and launched China on a Stalinist road to socialism. In so doing, he profoundly changed the country's economic and political landscape. Including rich archival materials recently released from China and Russia, this book carefully examines Mao's ideological orientation and his relationship with Stalin. Li argues that Mao made this policy shift for two reasons: his commitment to Stalin's ideas as expressed in an influential historical text compiled under Stalin's guidance on the Soviet experience of building socialism and his competitive zeal to surpass Stalin by building socialism in China faster than Stalin had achieved it in the Soviet Union. The timing of the change arose from Mao's belief that China was ready to begin building socialism and from his interpreting an ambiguous statement Stalin made in October 1952 as an endorsement of the policy shift. Situating its analysis within the larger context of the world communist movement, this carefully researched book will have a profound impact on the fields of communist studies and Sino-Soviet relations and in studies of Mao, Stalin, and their relationship

When the long-time Soviet leader Iosif Stalin died in March 1953, China was in the midst of a social transformation that was generating widespread anxiety and social tensions. Such sentiments were reflected in 30 reports compiled by Xinhua reporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concerning ordinary Chinese citizens' reactions to the death of Stalin. Some Chinese citizens had supported Stalin and, by extension, the CCP and were anxious about the CCP's ability to survive and rule in an uncertain post-Stalin world. Others were happy to see Stalin's departure and waited hopefully for the collapse of the CCP. This article assesses the wide range of opinions as reflected in the CCP's internal reports.

When the long-time Soviet leader Iosif Stalin died in March 1953, China was in the midst of a social transformation that was generating widespread anxiety and social tensions. Such sentiments were reflected in 30 reports compiled by Xinhua reporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concerning ordinary Chinese citizens' reactions to the death of Stalin. Some Chinese citizens had supported Stalin and, by extension, the CCP and were anxious about the CCP's ability to survive and rule in an uncertain post-Stalin world. Others were happy to see Stalin's departure and waited hopefully for the collapse of the CCP. This article assesses the wide range of opinions as reflected in the CCP's internal reports. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers a fresh perspective on the establishment of a one-party constitutional structure in China from 1948 to 1954, using documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the past two decades. These documents suggest that the Stalinization of China cannot be understood outside the larger context of the political Stalinization of the rest of the Communist world. Stalin played a critical role in determining the pace of political reform in China, and he actively encouraged Mao to allow non-Communists to take part in the Chinese electoral process and in the writing of the Chinese constitution. Although Mao would have preferred to establish a Soviet-style one-party system right away, he readily yielded to Stalin's advice. Mao chose to obey Stalin's dictates for political reform so that he could gain greater independence in domestic economic policies.

Discusses background of adoption of a constitution on Sept. 15, 1954 that provided the legal foundation for unchallenged rule of the Chinese Communist Party, in light of influence of Josif Stalin and the Soviet Union on the communist world during this era.