Suchergebnisse

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, "opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian." In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often "subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire."

Der Verfasser gibt zunächst einen Überblick über unterschiedliche Einschätzungen Volskys, die ihn als Repräsentanten reformfeindlicher institutioneller Interessen oder als zentristischen Repräsentanten einer neuen, dynamischen Unternehmerschaft sehen. Er behandelt im folgenden die Union von Wissenschaft und Industrie sowie den Russischen Unternehmerverband als organisatorische Lobby Volskys und zeigt, welchen Einfluß die Privatisierung sowohl auf Volskys soziale Basis als auch auf seinen individuellen politischen Erfolg ausübt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden Volskys wirtschaftspolitische Vorstellungen und sein Einfluß auf die russische Wirtschaftspolitik untersucht. Die Untersuchung macht deutlich, daß die hinter Volsky stehende Interessenkoalition keineswegs als homogener Machtblock gesehen werden kann und gegenwärtig starken zentrifugalen Kräften ausgesetzt ist. (BIOst-Wpt)

Machine generated contents note: Introduction: The Role of War in Russian History -- Marshall Poe and Eric Lohr -- PART I -- The Military and Society in Muscovy -- Troop Mobilization by the Muscovite Grand Princes(1313-1533) -- Donald Ostrowski -- The Costs of Muscovite Military Defense and Expansion -- Richard Hellie -- In Defense of the Realm: Russian Arms Trade and Production in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century -- J. T. Kotilaine -- The Second Chigirin Campaign: Late Muscovite Military Power in Transition -- Brian Davies -- Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich: Muscovite Military Command Style and Legacy to Russian Military History -- Peter B. Brown -- Evaluating Peter's Army: The Impact of Internal Organization -- Carol Stevens -- PART II -- Military and Society in Imperial Russia -- The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 -- John P. LeDonne -- The Russian Army in the Seven Years War -- John L. H. Keep -- Military Service and Social Hierarchy: The View from Eighteenth-Century Russian Theater -- Elise Kimmerling Wirtschafter -- The Nobility and the Officer Corps in the Nineteenth Century -- Walter Pintner -- Imperial War Games (1898-1906): Symbolic Displays of Power or Practical Training? -- John W. Steinberg -- Military Aviation, National Identity, and the Imperatives of Modernity in Late Imperial Russia -- Gregory Vitarbo -- "To Build a Great Russia": Civil-Military Relations in the Third Duma, 1907-12 -- David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye -- PART III -- Patriotism, Nationality, Religion and the Military -- Battle for the Divine Sophia? Ivan IV's Campaigns against Polotsk and Novgorod -- Sergei Bogatyrev -- Tatars in the Muscovite Army during the Livonian War -- Janet Martin -- Baptizing Mars: The Conversion to Russian Orthodoxy of European Mercenaries during the Mid-Seventeenth Century -- William Reger IV -- 'Guardians of the Faith' Jewish Traditional Societies in the Russian Army: The Case of the Thirty-Fifth Briansk Regiment -- Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtem -- Swords into Plowshares: Opposition to Military Service Among Sectarians, 1770s to 1874 -- Nicholas B. Breyfogel -- The Response of the Population of Moscow to the Napoleonic Occupation of 1812 -- Alexander M. Martin -- The Holy Sepulcher and the Origin of the Crimean War -- David Goldfrank -- Military Reform, Moral Reform, and the End of the Old Regime -- Josh Sanbor -- The Russian Military and the Jews in Galicia, 1914-15 -- Alexander V Prusin

Our essay proposes that while the predominant concept of revolution as driven by the mobilization of social, political, and cultural forces has value, at least as important for understanding the revolutions of 1917 was the dramatic demobilization of army, police, state, and society. We suggest that revolutions often see a conflict between affective mobilization (in which some portion of the citizenry becomes much more enthusiastic about particular social and political projects) and structural demobilization (in which the failure of major state institutions and economic enterprises makes positive social and political change nearly impossible). In early 1917, affective mobilization on behalf of the war and the regime was in decline, but structural mobilization was at its peak. The February Revolution brought a sudden radical structural demobilization. This structural demobilization both made it possible for relatively modest numbers of revolutionary forces to succeed in October 1917 and made the emergence of widespread apathy and disillusionment in 1918 much more likely.

Economic Nationalism, Confiscation, and Genocide: A Comparisation of the Ottoman and Russian Empires during World War I This article analyses the development of the Ottoman and Russian governments' economic persecution of the Armenians and Jews during World War I. It will chart how this policy moved from boycott to discrimination, into confiscation and outright plunder, resulting in economic ruination for the victims. It identifies the main currents and developments of this ruthless policy and how it affected Armenian and Jewish communities. So far there exists no comparative treatment of the expropriation of Ottoman Armenians and Russian Jews during World War I. This article aims to fill that gap by looking at the confiscation process through a combination of approaches, focussing on the development of the legal process, explaining the ideology of economic nationalism, and concretely demonstrating the policy on the ground.