Suchergebnisse

Private (out-of-pocket) healthcare expenditure (PHCE) is a complex phenomenon that is shaped by many different factors. In this paper, we analyzed the influencing factors of PHCE in China, with a specific focus on regional differences. We found that old-age dependency ratio, income, and education have significant impacts on PHCE in all regions, whereas public HCE, number of beds in medical institutions, and economic development levels have significant impacts only in some regions. The results indicate that the government should pay attention to regional inequality and implement targeted adjustments for improving the health service system. In particular, we recommend: (1) monitoring regional inequality in PHCE and other healthcare issues to unmask geographical differences in healthcare interventions ; (2) adopting regional-specific policy measures—the government should divert some resources from eastern to western and central regions to increasing the support for public health undertakings and improve the quality of the local health services while providing matching medical resources by targeting the needs of the residents ; (3) paying more attention to the healthcare demand of the elderly population ; and (4) improving the education level of residents to improve public health and avoid high PHCE.

AbstractThe size of organizational network, organizations' betweenness centrality and structural hole exert positive effects on organizational innovation capability. The intermediary effect of structural hole on organizational innovation capability is not significant. These outcomes enrich the understanding of the promoting effect of the inter‐organizational network on organizational innovation performance in general. The findings contribute to business practitioners in high‐tech clusters on their capability development.

AbstractUnder quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017