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This paper seeks to assess the tenability of Rhodes' view of the "new governance" as "governing without government," as well as the validity of Pierre and Peters' assertions that the state is still at the center of structures and processes of governance. The case used for analysis is Sweden's ecological modernization and the implementation of Local Investment Programs for Sustainable Development. This case provides a crucial test of the contradictory propositions of Rhodes and Pierre and Peters. Contrary to Rhodes' assertions, central government held the initiative in the process of implementing Sweden's ecological modernization. In line with the arrguments of Pierre and Peters central government created new structures and processes of governance to keep its initiative over constitutionally independent expert agencies and municipal governments—exactly those actors that, in Rhodes' view, could make central governmental steering well nigh impossible. As the paper illustrates, what government gains in direct control over the process, it may well lose in terms of the end results. The case of "new governance" analyzed here thus directs attention to the critical interplay between structure, process, and end results, and to government's role in governance.

Discusses ecological modernization and implementation in the late 1990s, focusing on structures and processes for sustainable development, intergovernmental management at the central and regional levels, and environmental policy issues.

This article starts from the assumption that some of the theoretical work used to explain welfare‐state expansion can be used 'in reverse' to explain privatization, here seen as welfare state contraction, i.e., the transfer from the public to the private sector of the responsibility for certain activities involved in welfare provision. To this end, valiants of the 'power resources' approach are examined. Finding that the 'labour movement' thesis does not have a strong predictive value, I then discuss the 'game theoretical' variant of the 'power resources' approach. Its usefulness for predicting privatization patterns seems limited because of the reductionism built into it. Following the neo‐Institutionalists' argument that actor preferences and strategies both reflect and form institutional arrangements of the welfare state, some institutional typologies are developed which are relevant to the course and patterns of privatization. An ideal‐type dichotomy between 'pluralist' and 'corporatist' institutions is discussed, in connection with a further delineation of decision‐making, financing, and implementing structures. In conclusion, an effort is made to combine actor‐oriented and institutional approaches to formulate some preliminary predictions about when and where certain patterns of privatization will occur.

ABSTRACTAffected by the ideological symbolism and political controversy surrounding privatization, much of the work on this subject is marred by definitional uncertainty; what should be included in the concept? To get away from this, and to prepare the ground for meaningful comparative analysis of the phenomenon, I propose both a definition and a taxonomy. I argue that it is the active and conscious transfer of reponsibility from the public to the private realm that should form the core of the concept. Furthermore, I argue that neither the principles for, nor the level of, provision of goods and services should be included in the definition. Finally, I propose that the taxonomy should be based on the public/private dichotomy of responsibility allocation included in the definition, as well as on three main activities in goods and services production which the government could privatize; regulation, financing, and production.

A definition & a taxonomy of the concept "privatization" is proposed. It is argued that the active & conscious transfer of responsibility from the public to the private realm forms the core of the concept. Furthermore, neither the principles for, nor the level of, provision of goods & services should be included in the definition. The taxonomy is based on the public/private dichotomy of responsibility allocation, & on three main activities in goods & services production that the could be privatized: regulation, financing, & production. 3 Figures, 46 References. Modified HA

Two strategies for increasing tenant influence and decreasing the need for state housing subsidies are discussed: 1) conversion of rental dwellings into cooperatives or condominiums, and 2) changes in the content of rental tenure. Some Scandinavian examples are presented as a basis for discussion of the viability of the two strategies. The conversion strategy does increase tenant influence, but may cause a less equitable distribution of housing standards and costs. Changing the content of rental tenure gives relatively less influence to tenants, but guarantees access for all to high quality, cost-rent housing.