Suchergebnisse

This article addresses the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de‐politicized civil services and the politicization of personnel policy at the central government level of post‐communist countries. It develops the concept of formal political discretion as an analytical tool for the assessment of how and to what extent legislative frameworks governing civil services provide institutional conditions for the de‐politicization of personnel policy. The case of Hungary shows that since the change of regime in 1989/90, four civil service reforms have led to the adoption, implementation and revision of civil service legislation that has gradually reduced the possibilities for government ministers to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Civil service reforms have also led to the institutionalization of various discretionary instruments which ministers can and have used to politicize civil service affairs. The adoption and implementation of civil service laws therefore does not necessarily lead to the de‐politicization of civil services.

It is problematic to classify the relationship between political parties & the state in post-communist Hungary as a case of low or no party patronage & state politicization. A study of the ministerial bureaucracy reveals that the passing of public administration reforms has not provided an effective constraint against politicization, & that the politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy has increased over time in terms of extent, intensity & scope. Comparison of four post-communist governments in Hungary permits one to relate the politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy to the desire of governing parties to enhance their political control over the formulation & implementation of public policies under conditions of polarized political competition between former communists & their political allies, on the one side, & anti-communist parties, on the other. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The 2009 SIGMA assessment of the civil services in the new EU member states, which joined the EU in 2004, revealed that only the Lithuanian civil service achieved a high degree of fit with the European principles of public administration. The article seeks to determine main reasons behind this favourable assessment of Lithuania. Compared to other countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the development of the Lithuanian civil service was marked by relative continuity and consistency. In addition, the article presents two main alternatives for further developing the Lithuanian civil service: a stabilisation and consolidation of the Lithuanian civil service as well as its moderate managerial reform. To implement these alternatives, the article outlines a number of short-term and medium-term recommendations for Lithuanian decision-makers. ; 2009 metais organizacijos SIGMA tyrėjams atlikus naujųjų Europos Sąjungos (toliau – ES) šalių narių, kurios 2004 m. įstojo į ES, valstybės tarnybų vertinimą, Lietuvos valstybės tarnybos atitiktis Europos viešojo administravimo principams buvo įvertinta geriausiai. Straipsnyje siekiama nustatyti svarbiausias palankaus Lietuvos valstybės tarnybos vertinimo priežastis. Parodyta, kad palyginti su kitomis Rytų ir Vidurio Europos šalimis, Lietuvos valstybės tarnybos vystymuisi būdingas santykinis tęstinumas ir nuoseklumas. Be to, straipsnyje pateikiamos tolesnės Lietuvos valstybės tarnybos vystymo alternatyvos: valstybės tarnybos stabilizacija bei konsolidacija ir nuosaiki vadybinė reforma. Šioms alternatyvoms įgyvendinti pateikiamos trumpojo ir vidutinio laikotarpio rekomendacijos, skirtos Lietuvos sprendimų priėmėjams.

SUMMARYThis article examines the relationship between management of the ministerial bureaucracy and the risk of high‐level corruption in Poland. Four danger zones of corruption in the ministerial bureaucracy are distinguished, comprising the personalisation of appointments, the emergence of multiple dependencies, the screening capacity of the personnel system and the incentive of bureaucrats to develop a reputation of honesty and competence. Empirically, the article investigates the case of Poland from 1997 until 2007 and sets the findings in a comparative East Central European perspective. The article shows that corruption risks in the ministerial bureaucracy increased in most but not all danger zones after 2001 and, in particular, during the period of the centre‐right governments that were in office between 2005 and 2007. The increase in corruption risks is reflected in Poland's deteriorating corruption record during the same period. The conclusion discusses the findings with regard to alternative causes of corruption and the relationship between civil service professionalisation and corruption in other East Central European countries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.