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The teaching of citizenship might seem inappropriate for a political scientist. Such teaching is normative, it might be said, but political science is empirical. And, it might be added, citizenship is a parochial concern for the good of one's own country, whereas political science is based on a universal love of truth. These objections will have to be made more precise, even recast; but insofar as they suggest that good citizen and good political scientist may not be the same thing, they are perfectly reasonable.The distinction between empirical and normative, or fact and value (which cannot be explored theoretically here), means that a political scientist, as political scientist, cannot tell citizens whether citizenship is a good thing, or say that political science is a good thing and ought to be welcomed or tolerated by citizens. A political scientist might perhaps remark empirically, or half-empirically, that love of one's country animates the citizens as citizen and love of truth inspires the political scientist as political scientist. But instead of leading to conflict between citizens and political scientists and hence to a problem for political scientists, who must be both, this observation is made to yield a queer harmony between the two. It is thought that since political scientists cannot pronounce upon the worth of citizenship, they do not get in the way of citizens. Their work is neutral to that of citizens. Love of truth does not interfere with love of country because all loves, being "values," are incommensurable. Thus, the methodology of the fact-value distinction provides a lefthanded endorsement of (at least democratic) citizenship.

The teaching of citizenship might seem inappropriate for a political scientist. Such teaching is normative, it might be said, but political science is empirical. And, it might be added, citizenship is a parochial concern for the good of one's own country, whereas political science is based on a universal love of truth. These objections will have to be made more precise, even recast; but insofar as they suggest that good citizen and good political scientist may not be the same thing, they are perfectly reasonable.The distinction between empirical and normative, or fact and value (which cannot be explored theoretically here), means that a political scientist, as political scientist, cannot tell citizens whether citizenship is a good thing, or say that political science is a good thing and ought to be welcomed or tolerated by citizens. A political scientist might perhaps remark empirically, or half-empirically, that love of one's country animates the citizens as citizen and love of truth inspires the political scientist as political scientist. But instead of leading to conflict between citizens and political scientists and hence to a problem for political scientists, who must be both, this observation is made to yield a queer harmony between the two. It is thought that since political scientists cannot pronounce upon the worth of citizenship, they do not get in the way of citizens. Their work is neutral to that of citizens. Love of truth does not interfere with love of country because all loves, being "values," are incommensurable. Thus, the methodology of the fact-value distinction provides a lefthanded endorsement of (at least democratic) citizenship.

The modern state, by contrast to the Aristotelian regime, is essentially impersonal. For Machiavelli, stato is extremely personal; yet, it is argued, Machiavelli laid the foundation for the modern state in his general and impartial advice to acquire stato. The argument proceeds by an analysis of Machiavelli's use ofstato,after a brief consideration of its medieval counterparts.

IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1982 RONALD REAGAN asked the American people to 'stay the course', and they have just responded with a definite negative that is nonethless difficult to interpret. The results were bad for the Republicans: a 26-seat loss in the House of Representatives, creating a 99-seat Democratic majority and ending the de facto Reagan majority there; and a loss of seven state governors together with many state representatives. The Republicans held their margin of eight in the Senate.

Machiavelli is presented as the founder of modern political science, with due regard to the fact that he never spoke of "political science." His usage of "prudence" and "art" in The Prince is examined to see whether, as founder, he was a teacher or a ruler of future generations. His comprehensive attack on classical political science is outlined and developed through two essential points, the cycle and the soul.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION JUST HELD APPEARS to have been a momentous event. It was the greatest repudiation of an incumbent president and party in America since that of Hoover and the Republicans in 1931. Predicted by no one — by neither political scientist, pollster nor politician — this was as much a surprise to joyful Republicans as to luckless Democrats. The voters had not discussed the matter much, except in deprecatory terms borrowed from the media, and on the morning after they too looked around among themselves with wonder and satisfaction.It could hardly be believed, as Carter's pollster asserted, that everyone turned to Reagan on the last day when the hostages held in Iran failed to appear. Something so considerable must have been meditated, or at least prepared; and this misfortune for Carter does not explain why the Democratic Senators, who were not involved with Iran, were voted out. Perhaps the large number of 'undecideds' were Reagan voters, too embarrassed to confess their decision to callers they suspected were unsympathetic. Or perhaps — a wishful fantasy of mine — the voters deliberately did not disclose their intention to the pollsters since they knew that sovereignty stays alive only with an occasional surprise. The voters may have sensed that they can be exploited if they can be predicted.

THE MEDIA ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF SOMETHING - THAT IS FOR certain - but of what? They appear at frrst to be nothing in themselves, merely a facility of communication. They facilitate communication among a people, especially among a large people, and thus make that people more of a people, a whole that is conscious of itself and that, being so, can move together. We call a people of this sort a democratic people, or simply a democracy, implying that the communication among a people which makes possible a whole people is, or substitutes for, a form of government. As the media facilitate communication especially among a large people, they especially facilitate modern democracy, which, as opposed to ancient democracy, is the democracy of a large people.