Suchergebnisse

Organizations working with refugees are increasingly using information communication technologies (ICTs) in their work. While there is a rich literature in the field of media and communications studies exploring how refugees use ICTs to meet their social and economic needs, this article focuses on whether and how refugees' ICT use maps onto the policy concept of refugee self-reliance, focusing on the economic, educational, administrative, health, and security/protection domains of self-reliance in informal urban settings. Building on the literature on refugees' ICT use, we use semi-structured interviews with urban refugees in Malaysia to understand how they use technology in their daily lives and whether these refugees' digital practices support self-reliance. We also interviewed practitioners from the Malaysian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors to better understand such institutions' strategies for using ICTs to deliver economic, educational, administrative, health, and protection programs in local refugee communities. Our findings are twofold: refugees' use of ICTs represented idiosyncratic ways of achieving self-reliance, but when institutions tried to implement ICT solutions to support refugee self-reliance at a population level, refugees either did not use these ICT solutions or were critical of the institutional solutions. The findings presented here have import for not only research on refugee self-reliance and ICTs but also the wider migration field, as organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration and national immigration authorities, integrate ICTs into processes that affect migrants' and displaced peoples' economic, social, and political inclusion in cities of arrival.

Bei den deutschen und europäischen Bemühungen, die irreguläre Zuwanderung vor allem aus Subsahara-Afrika zu verringern, ruhen große Hoffnungen auf der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Sie soll helfen, möglichst viele Ursachen für solche Wanderungen zu beseitigen. In allen einschlägigen Konzepten wird ihr eine Schlüsselrolle zugewiesen. Dies wirft grundsätzliche Fragen nach dem Zusammenhang von Entwicklung und Migration auf. In der wissenschaftlichen Debatte gilt seit längerem als belegt, dass sozioökonomische Entwicklung Migration fördert, statt sie zu reduzieren. Tatsächlich aber ist diese Kausalbeziehung nicht so eindeutig, wie es das entsprechende Modell des 'migration hump' suggeriert. Offenbar werden Wanderungsentscheidungen durch weitere Faktoren beeinflusst. Daher ist es problematisch, wenn die Politik diese Scheinevidenz aufgreift und daraus simple Strategien ableitet. Der Kontext von Migration und Entwicklung muss differenzierter analysiert werden. Auf diese Weise lassen sich entwicklungspolitische Ansätze auch für die Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Partnerstaaten gewinnen.

German and European efforts to reduce irregular migration, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa, place a great emphasis on development co-operation. The aim is for this to eliminate as many causes of such migration as possible. This raises questions concerning the interrelation of development and migration. In the academic debate, it is well established that socio-economic development promotes migration rather than reducing it. But this causal relationship is not as clear-cut as the corresponding 'migration hump' model suggests. It is evident that migration decisions are also influenced by further factors. It is therefore problematic when policy makers use this apparent evidence to assume stopping development aid will stop migration. The context of migration and development needs to be analysed with an eye towards managing multiple drivers of migration. Donor countries should also utilize development policy approaches that lead to co-operation with African partner states.

Many view development co-operation as a key to reducing irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa. However, critics note that increased socio-economic development is likely to lead to more, rather than less, migration. Historical and cross-country comparison studies have shown that emigration initially increases when economic growth and rising income levels enable countries to emerge from the status of a low-income country. Only when the status of upper middle-income country has been achieved can a decrease in international migration be anticipated. Known as a "migration hump", this correlation between development and migration also applies for sub-Saharan Africa. However, it cannot be explained solely by rising incomes and increased education. It is also driven by other factors, including demographic transition, changes in economic structures, emulation effects in migration processes, rising inequality, credit restrictions and the lowering of migration barriers. The implication that positive socio-economic development in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa would inexorably lead to an increase in irregular migration to Europe is therefore an oversimplification. Irregular migration in particular is not driven by economic motives alone. Instead this is an example of so-called "mixed migration", in which the drivers of voluntary and forced migration blend together. Factors such as corruption, weak rule of law, human rights infringements and fragile statehood are key drivers here. Development co-operation cannot hinder migration, due also to the fact that Africa's development is not solely dependent on it. Instead, development policy co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa should focus on promoting orderly, safe and legal migration, which in turn offers positive development potential while working to prevent forced and irregular migration. Specific development policy measures should therefore include: Migration processes influenced by development policy: The opportunities for regular migration to Germany and Europe need to be expanded and ac¬companied (for example via qualification measures). Support for intraregional migration: The efforts of the African regional organisations to control intraregional migration – which constitutes a large portion of migration movements – should be supported. Prevention of brain drain: The emigration of skilled personnel required in the countries of origin should be managed via targeted investment in training partnerships in specific sectors. Promotion of good governance, democracy and rule of law: Development policy measures in this area can make a key contribution to reducing human rights violations, and therefore decrease drivers of flight and forced displacement.

Viele sehen in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit einen Schlüssel zur Reduzierung der irregulären Zuwanderung aus Subsahara-Afrika. Doch Kritiker wenden ein, mehr sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung führe erfahrungsgemäß nicht zu weniger, sondern zu mehr Migration. Tatsächlich haben historische und ländervergleichende Untersuchungen gezeigt, dass in der Regel Auswanderung erst einmal zunimmt, wenn Länder durch Wirtschaftswachstum und entsprechend steigende Einkommen den Status eines "Low Income Country" hinter sich lassen. Erst wenn sie den Status eines "Upper Middle Income Country" erreichen, ist mit einer Abnahme der internationalen Migration zu rechnen. Dieser als "migration hump" bezeichnete Zusammenhang zwischen Entwicklung und Migration gilt auch für Subsahara-Afrika. Allerdings lässt er sich nicht nur durch steigende Einkommen und höhere Bildung erklären. Vielmehr wird er auch durch andere Faktoren begünstigt. Dazu zählen: demographischer Wandel, wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel, Nachahmungseffekte bei Migrationsprozessen, steigende Ungleichheit, Kreditrestriktionen und sinkende Migrationsbarrieren. Die Folgerung, dass eine positive sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung in den Ländern Subsahara-Afrikas vor allem zu einer Zunahme der irregulären Zuwanderung nach Europa führen würde, ist also eine unzulässige Vereinfachung. Gerade irreguläre Migration wird nicht durch wirtschaftliche Motive alleine befeuert. Vielmehr handelt es sich hier um sogenannte "gemischte Wanderungen", bei denen sich Motive freiwilliger und Zwangsmigration vermischen. Faktoren wie Korruption, unzureichende Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechtsverletzungen und fragile Staatlichkeit sind hier maßgebliche Treiber. Entwicklungszusammenarbeit kann Migration nicht verhindern, zumal Afrikas Entwicklung nicht alleine von EZ abhängt. Vielmehr muss es bei der entwicklungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit mit Subsahara Afrika darum gehen, geordnete, sichere und legale Migration zu fördern, die wiederum ein positives Entwicklungspotenzial hat – und erzwungene, ungeordnete und irreguläre Migration zu unterbinden. Konkrete entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen sollten daher beinhalten: Entwicklungspolitisch gestaltete Migrationsprozesse: Die Möglichkeiten der regulären Zuwanderung nach Deutschland und Europa müssen erweitert und flankiert werden (z.B. durch Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen). Unterstützung intraregionaler Migration: Die Bemühungen der afrikanischen Regionalorganisationen, intraregionale Migration – die einen Großteil der Migrationsbewegungen ausmacht – zu gestalten, sollten unterstützt werden. Verhinderung von Braindrain: Der Abwanderung von in den Herkunftsländern benötigten Fachkräften sollte durch gezielte Investitionen und neue Ansätze wie z. B. Ausbildungspartnerschaften entgegengewirkt werden. Förderung von guter Regierungsführung, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit: Entwicklungspolitische Maß-nahmen in diesem Bereich können einen wichtigen Beitrag dazu leisten, dass Menschenrechtsverletzungen oder mangelnde Rechtsstaatlichkeit und somit Gründe für ungeordnete oder erzwungene Migration abnehmen.

Abstract
Refugee response has become an important topic in economic-development policy, but the majority of macro-level analyses do not find an association between country income level and refugee numbers. We argue that the apparent lack of association stems from using the United Nations High Commission for Refugees' count of refugees as the dependent variable in these analyses. Refugee counts reflect processes that take place in countries of arrival. In contrast, the decision to seek asylum may be more closely linked to conditions, including income, in countries of origin. Drawing on the 'migration-hump' concept from economic migration, we model counts of refugees and asylum seekers from conflict-affected countries for the same time period and find that differences in the level of gross domestic product (GDP) predict new asylum applications but not new refugee numbers. We outline reasons for this statistical finding, and discuss theoretical and practical consequences for our understanding of the relationship between country income and asylum-seeking.

State fragility, which describes how different components of a state do (or do not) function, is a central concept for understanding how development activities and policies in complex political, humanitarian and conflict-affected contexts will (or will not) work in practice. Using fragility as a lens, we use feminist development policy and forced displacement as examples to demonstrate how different empirical conceptualisations of fragility can be used to uncover potential challenges and identify opportunities for more comprehensive policy and programming. These examples are only two ways one can apply the concepts of fragility of the OECD and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Indeed, these and other empirical concepts of state fragility have many applications and can be used to measure and understand state–society, conflict and humanitarian dynamics in myriad ways. The longest-running among these kinds of models is the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2023). Other models focus on state fragility as a function of different aspects of "stateness". This includes IDOS's Constellations of State Fragility typology, which clusters types of fragility based on strengths/weaknesses in key dimensions of statehood (Grävingholt et al., 2019). Some organisations have moved beyond an exclusive focus on the functioning of the state, with the OECD currently defining fragility contexts as the combination of risks and insufficient coping capacities of multiple levels of governance systems and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks (OECD, 2016). The IDOS and OECD concepts do not rank countries, and the methods used in both models allow them to be applied to different levels of analysis. Essentially, these empirical conceptualisations of state fragility can serve as useful heuristics for the policy-makers responsible for setting policy agendas in fragile contexts. The key challenge for policy-makers that we address in this policy brief is the step from empirically categorising states' fragility, to using that empirical data to inform often fast-moving, idiosyncratic policy-making and implementation in fragile contexts. As noted previously, these concepts are heuristics; country-specific policy planning and implementation require more fine-grained monitoring of country contexts. To achieve this, we recommend: Donors should be aware that the suitability of a particular tool/ fragility lens depends on the specific problem at hand, and they should choose the tool following a rigorous problem analysis. Use Germany's leadership on feminist foreign and development policy to capture and highlight the full range of links between gender and fragility, and to continue strengthening feminist foreign and development policy in fragile contexts. In many cases, state fragility is a neighbourhood challenge that requires regional coordination in order to be managed. In the case of migration and displacement, donors can support the freedom of movement protocols in regional agreements such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Policy-makers and donor organisations should deepen investment in new avenues for collecting and standardising the data that is used to generate different empirical concepts of state fragility. This includes funding on-the-ground monitoring activities such as IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in East Africa. Recognise that otherwise functional states can indeed have sub-national pockets of severe fragility, and that these variations in sub-national fragility can over time erode the capacity, legitimacy and authority of the state if left unchecked.

This policy brief outlines how feminist development policy can be locally enacted by taking an intersectional approach to the provision of assistance to refugees and displaced persons. Refugee-led organisations (RLOs) play a key role in providing collective services, particularly in contexts where the host government is unlikely or unwilling to provide access to local social services. This is especially true in non-camp settings, and as global refugee policy moves away from encampment as a response to refugees the role of RLOs in refugees' daily lives will only increase. While RLOs are an important part of life in a refugee community, they can be especially useful in supporting the needs of women, children, LGBTIQ refugees, ethnic minorities and diverse-ability refugees across multiple refugee communities city- or region-wide. Taking an inter¬sectional approach to understanding the role of RLOs, in particular RLOs led by women, can help policy-makers identify networks of local actors who can effective¬ly meet the social needs of all members of a local refugee community, including those who face particular marginali¬sation due to gender, sexual, religious or ethnic identity. The intersectional approach to working with RLOs focuses on meeting the needs of marginalised identity groups across the entire refugee population in a city or region. For example, refugees representing multiple ethnic groups or nationalities might have their own ethnic or national RLO, but that RLO may not be able to meet the unique needs of women, children, LGBTIQ and reli¬gious minorities within the community. An inter-sectional approach means engaging all the RLOs in a city or region to meet the social, health and protection needs of margin¬alised community members, with the under¬standing that in doing so the wider needs of all community members will be met. RLOs are part of a wider ecosystem of services and organisations that support refugees, and while they play a unique role in enacting feminist development policy for refugees, they have limitations. Policy-makers should engage them alongside official authorities from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the host country govern¬ment when possible. Given the challenges and opportuni¬ties that come with taking an intersectional approach to meeting refugees' needs through engage¬ment with women-led RLOs, we offer the following recommendations to policy-makers: • Funding RLOs in situations where refugees have no legal status is challenging. In many cases, RLOs can provide intersectional social services, but often need funding to do so. Donors can localise their programming by funding NGOs that collaborate with RLOs, and allowing NGOs to redistribute funding to their RLO partners. • Trusting RLOs as a mediator for connecting refugees to official protection and legal services. Refugees living in situations where they may not have legal status often trust RLOs more than they do official agencies such as UNHCR. Donors can therefore support RLOs in providing protection against hostile legal environments for asylum seekers. • Mitigating risks associated with RLOs' ethnic, national, and religious biases. RLOs come with their own limitations and problems. They are often informal institutions, and in many cases lack UNHCR's legal status. Since they are community-based, they can also at times replicate existing biases within an ethnic or national community. Donors should be aware of this risk when working with RLOs.

As increased migration, particularly to urban centres, and digitalisation play a greater role in development cooperation, more research on how these phenomena interact will become critical. Information communication technologies (ICTs) offer pathways for potentially making it easier for migrants to settle in, whether it be through e-government programmes or by accessing social networks that can help in finding housing and work. To better understand how ICTs fit into urban migrants' lives, we gathered new survey data in Bogota comparing how long-term residents, short-term residents, and Venezuelan migrants access and use ICTs. We identified a new factor that influences internet access among migrants after controlling for economic and social factors: duration of time in a neighbourhood. While migrants initially lag behind their neighbours in ICT and internet access, the longer they stay in one neighbourhood, the more likely they are to gain access to these technologies. Indeed, over time, our data shows that migrants become more likely than their neighbours to gain access to ICTs and the internet when they continue to stay in the same neighbourhood. Our results also show that uptake of e-government services remains a challenge. Citizens generally do not interact with their governments more than a few times a year, and migrants may not interact at all. Especially when working with vulnerable or "hidden" populations, development organisations need to put significant resources into education and outreach so that the populations they are trying to reach know about e-government services, and their value. The data collected in Bogota paints a potentially positive picture about using ICTs with migrants and migrant communities. By effectively engaging migrants early on and meeting basic initial needs such as housing or access to identification, development and humanitarian agencies could help migrants gain greater access to ICTs and make use of e-government platforms.

As increased migration, particularly to urban centres, and digitalisation play a greater role in development cooperation, more research on how these phenomena interact will become critical. Information communication technologies (ICTs) offer pathways for potentially making it easier for migrants to settle in, whether it be through e-government programmes or by accessing social networks that can help in finding housing and work.To better understand how ICTs fit into urban migrants' lives, we gathered new survey data in Bogota comparing how long-term residents, short-term residents, and Venezuelan migrants access and use ICTs. We identified a new factor that influences internet access among migrants after controlling for economic and social factors: duration of time in a neighbourhood. While migrants initially lag behind their neighbours in ICT and internet access, the longer they stay in one neighbourhood, the more likely they are to gain access to these technologies. Indeed, over time, our data shows that migrants become more likely than their neighbours to gain access to ICTs and the internet when they continue to stay in the same neighbourhood.Our results also show that uptake of e-government services remains a challenge. Citizens generally do not interact with their governments more than a few times a year, and migrants may not interact at all. Especially when working with vulnerable or "hidden" populations, development organisations need to put significant resources into education and outreach so that the populations they are trying to reach know about e-government services, and their value.The data collected in Bogota paints a potentially positive picture about using ICTs with migrants and migrant communities. By effectively engaging migrants early on and meeting basic initial needs such as housing or access to identification, development and humanitarian agencies could help migrants gain greater access to ICTs and make use of e-government platforms.