Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article analyses ongoing changes in the supply of alternative media of payments (MOPs). The comparison between old (cash and deposits) and new (cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies) MOPs is based on a novel definition of money where a MOP has three properties: the first two are the standard functions of medium of exchange (liquidity costs) and store of value (opportunity costs) and the third is the novel function of store of information (privacy costs). Given such properties and that the evolution of the different MOPs likely depends on individual preferences, the relevance of experimental economics is highlighted.

This paper analyses how the role of the central bank can influence the unification of the overall financial supervision architecture. We claim that the policymaker's choices can be viewed as a sequential process in which the institutional status quo matters. The degree of unification in supervision is decided based on the position of the central bank. If the central bank involvement in supervision and its reputation are high, the unification level is likely to be low, and vice versa. The central bank fragmentation effect can be explained through the three possible channels of moral hazard, bureaucracy, and reputation endowment effects. The empirical analysis-performed with ordered logit and probit functions on a dataset of 89 countries-confirms the robustness of the central bank fragmentation effect. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier B.V.]

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a con

Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi -- The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup -- Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini -- Financial supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro -- Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini -- Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Cihak and Richard Podpiera -- Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia -- Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriette Prast -- Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini -- Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis