Suchergebnisse

Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages stricter standards for the transnational enforcement of intellectual property rights, received strong support from business groups. Nevertheless, a campaign against the agreement that was initiated by a small number of citizen groups was successful in stopping its ratification in the European Union (EU). This result is puzzling because the anti-ACTA side controlled few material resources and should have found it difficult to have its voice heard on an issue negotiated at the international level. We explain the success of the anti-ACTA campaign by showing how interest groups managed to increase the public salience of the issue; how the increasing public salience motivated a growing number of interest groups to mobilize; and how the resulting dynamic made decision-makers opt against ratification of the agreement. The article advances scholarly understanding of the interaction between lobbying and public opinion and sheds light on the defeat of ACTA. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractInterest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to 'go public' by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type – namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups – is a major determinant of the choice of strategy. The effect of group type, however, is conditional on the group's endowment with material resources and the issue context: the differences across group types are largest for resource‐rich associations and associations active in distributive policy fields. Original data from surveys of national associations in fiveEuropean countries (Austria,Germany,Ireland,Latvia andSpain) enable the assessment of this argument. The theoretical expectations are supported, with the results having relevance for the normative evaluation of political systems and the positive study of interest group influence.

Early theorists of European integration expected that political actors such as interest groups would shift their political activities towards the new centre, leading to further political integration in Europe. Half a century later, we assess this expectation and find large variation in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and have shifted their political activities to Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that focus on group type, group resources, policy held and the size of the group's home country. Using data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The paper has implications for the literatures on lobbying, decision-making in the EU, Europeanization and theories of European integration. ; M1217-G16 ; (VLID)1771033

Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to 'go public' by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type -- namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups -- is a major determinant of the choice of strategy. The effect of group type, however, is conditional on the group's endowment with material resources and the issue context: the differences across group types are largest for resource-rich associations and associations active in distributive policy fields. Original data from surveys of national associations in five European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, Latvia and Spain) enable the assessment of this argument. The theoretical expectations are supported, with the results having relevance for the normative evaluation of political systems and the positive study of interest group influence. Adapted from the source document.

What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens' groups to parliaments. Using original data from a survey of 1,417 interest groups in Germany, Ireland and Spain, we find support for these expectations. We conclude that national associations are heavily involved in EU lobbying, but that resource-endowment and type matter for access. The article is of relevance to the literatures on interest groups in the EU, the EU's (alleged) democratic deficit, and the role of civil society in governance beyond the nation state. Adapted from the source document.

Why did some political parties in the EU member states support and others oppose a facultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty? The authors argue that electoral competition played a major role in determining how parties positioned themselves with respect to the desirability of a referendum. Parties that expected electoral gains supported and those that expected electoral losses opposed a referendum. The hypotheses that the authors derive from this argument draw attention to variables such as public support for the treaty', the closeness of the next elections, party size, and public demand for a referendum. An original data set that comprises the positions of 176 parties on whether to submit the Constitutional Treaty to a referendum allows the authors to examine these hypotheses empirically. Using a multilevel logistic regression model, they find support for their argument, even when controlling for party ideology and institutional constraints. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Why did some political parties in the EU member states support and others oppose a facultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty? The authors argue that electoral competition played a major role in determining how parties positioned themselves with respect to the desirability of a referendum. Parties that expected electoral gains supported and those that expected electoral losses opposed a referendum. The hypotheses that the authors derive from this argument draw attention to variables such as public support for the treaty, the closeness of the next elections, party size, and public demand for a referendum. An original data set that comprises the positions of 176 parties on whether to submit the Constitutional Treaty to a referendum allows the authors to examine these hypotheses empirically. Using a multilevel logistic regression model, they find support for their argument, even when controlling for party ideology and institutional constraints.