Suchergebnisse

Der Artikel untersucht das Scheitern aller Verhandlungen zur Beendigung des englisch-deutschen Flottenwettrüstens 1906 bis 1914. Das Versagen, zu einer Vereinbarung zu kommen, wird als lehrreich für die Probleme von Rüstungskontrollpolitik betrachtet. Entscheidend war die Hartnäckigkeit mit der beide Seiten an ihren jeweils eigenen, unvereinbaren außen- bzw. sicherheitspolitischen Zielen und strategischen Einschätzungen festhielten. Während die britische Regierung auf dem status quo eigener maritimer Hegemonie beharrte, war für die deutsche Seite (zumindest für den Kaiser und die Admiralität) eine starke Flotte unabdingbares Instrument deutscher Weltpolitik. (SWP-BRN)

The last stage of the Anglo-German naval arms race before the First World War provides a valuable case study for the evaluation of current theories about the development of cooperation between intensely competitive states. After 1912 the naval competition between Britain and Germany resembled a game of prisoners' dilemma, as decision makers in both countries concluded that they benefitted from reciprocal restraint in battleship-building programs. Another striking feature of the naval rivalry in this period is that a modified version of a tit-for-tat strategy, devised by none other than Winston Churchill, who then served as first lord of Britain's Admiralty, played a critical role in controlling the competition. This essay analyzes the domestic political, diplomatic, and strategic factors that promoted mutual restraint in the battleship-building programs of Britain and Germany. Another purpose of this essay is to explore the limits of cooperation and to examine why this informal understanding on naval armaments did not lead to a significant improvement in Anglo-German relations.

The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results