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Tax-based incomes policy, that would offer tax reductions to firms and workers that keep their prices or wages within a specified rate; possible effect on wage inflation.

This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties are low.

When confronted by catastrophic wildfire risk, homeowners simultaneously allocate resources between insurance and averting activities. Expected utility theory suggests that complete insurance coverage precludes investment in averting activities. However, when potential losses include a significant nonmarket component, optimal choice includes both. To investigate this issue, the authors analyze a unique combination of contingent valuation and experimental data. Both settings include a split‐sample treatment to test the influence of wildfire risk zone information. The authors find that amenity values, subjective risk, averting efficacy perception, and demographic factors influence both willingness to pay and averting share and that risk information has the predicted ordering effect. (JELC9,Q51,Q54)

There is considerable evidence that enforcement efforts can increase tax compliance. However, there must be other forces at work because observed compliance levels cannot be fully explained by the level of enforcement actions typical of most tax authorities. Further, there are observed differences, not related to enforcement effort, in the levels of compliance across countries and cultures. To fully understand differences in compliance behavior across cultures one needs to understand differences in tax administration and citizen attitudes toward governments. The working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in behavior have foundations in these institutions. Tax compliance is a complex behavioral issue and its investigation requires the use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from laboratory experiments conducted in different countries demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels can be explained by differences in the fairness of tax administration, in the perceived fiscal exchange, and in the overall attitude towards the respective governments. These experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.