In: Journal of international relations and development: JIRD, official journal of the Central and East European International Studies Association, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 288-303
Die in der Disziplin der Internationalen Beziehungen (IB)allseits vorhandene Vorstellung, vorgefertigte Denkschemata und Gefühle würden lediglich irrationale Ergebnisse produzieren, greift bezüglich der Verbindung zwischen Rationalität und Psychologie in drei Punkten zu kurz: wenn Psychologie nur Fehler erklärt, dann müsste Rationalität erstens ohne Psychologie erklärbar sein, zweitens bräuchte Rationalität psychologische Grundannahmen und drittens könnte Psychologie keine akkuraten Entscheidungen erklären. Diese Vorstellung ist zwar kohärent und logisch, jedoch falsch. Obwohl die Widerlegung einer der Punkte reicht um alle zu verwerfen, wird dennoch jeder einzeln behandelt. Es wird nicht gefordert, dass psychologische Modelle rationale ersetzen sollen, sondern es geht um eine sinnvolle Ergänzung und Erweiterung. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen ('strategic choice') oder unter Verwendung bestimmter Konzepte (z.B. Vertrauen, Identität, Gerechtigkeit, Reputation) kann ein psychologischer Erklärungsansatz einem rationalen Ansatz überlegen sein
Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences. Its creators won a Nobel Prize in economics, & it is largely responsible for the booming field of behavioral economics. Although international relations theorists who study security have used prospect theory extensively, Americanists, comparativists, & political economists have shown little interest in it. The dominant explanation for political scientists' tepid response focuses on the theoretical problems with extending a theory devised in the lab to explain political decisions in the field. This essay focuses on these problems & reviews suggested solutions. It suggests that prospect theory's failure to ignite the imagination of more political scientists probably results from their aversion to behavioral assumptions & not from problems unique to prospect theory. 92 References. Adapted from the source document.
Is there escape from a self-help system? Realists say no. They assume states are egoistic actors in anarchy; this means states must either look out for themselves or risk destruction: structure generates a self-help system. Constructivists think escape is possible. Because identities are made, not given, we should not make a priori assumptions of state egoism: process generates self-help. Process could also generate an other-help security system. This article introduces a third approach that uses social identity theory to argue that interstate relations are inherently competitive. Thus, for cognitive and motivated—rather than structural or social—reasons, competition, which can be coercive or cooperative, characterizes international politics.
Examines definitions of conventions and precedents in international relations, and argues that existing taboos regarding use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons should be supported; US.