Suchergebnisse

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is frequently labeled 'charismatic,' but this aspect of his leadership has mostly escaped direct argument and analysis. The authors offer a measure of charisma and a reciprocal account of the relationship between charisma and performance evaluations. Data from a national survey of Venezuelans confirm that perceptions of Chavez's charisma in 2007 were comparatively high. Using three-stage least squares regression analysis the authors then document a highly dynamic process, by which poor performance erodes perceptions of Chavez's charisma (and favors an opponent) while lingering beliefs in that charisma lead some to see better conditions than are perceived by those who do not subscribe to the charismatic sheen. The argument and analysis sharpen understandings of the nature, determinants, and consequences of charisma. The authors suggest that and explain why public support for Chavez is likely to recede at a slow, protracted pace rather than be abruptly withdrawn. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is frequently labeled "charismatic," but this aspect of his leadership has mostly escaped direct argument and analysis. The authors offer a measure of charisma and a reciprocal account of the relationship between charisma and performance evaluations. Data from a national survey of Venezuelans confirm that perceptions of Chávez's charisma in 2007 were comparatively high. Using three-stage least squares regression analysis the authors then document a highly dynamic process, by which poor performance erodes perceptions of Chávez's charisma (and favors an opponent) while lingering beliefs in that charisma lead some to see better conditions than are perceived by those who do not subscribe to the charismatic sheen. The argument and analysis sharpen understandings of the nature, determinants, and consequences of charisma. The authors suggest that and explain why public support for Chávez is likely to recede at a slow, protracted pace rather than be abruptly withdrawn.

To what extent did citizens in 2006 see Felipe Calderon & Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador as strong & charismatic? What factors shaped these perceptions of the candidates' images? Did these perceptions have any significance for vote choice? Using data from the 2006 CIDE-CSES survey, we show first that Calderon & Lopez Obrador were perceived on average to have similar leadership strengths. We then argue & show evidence using multiple variable regression analysis that conditions of threat have important effects on perceptions of leadership & charisma. Finally, we justify the importance of candidate image by demonstrating the close relationship between perceptions of these two candidates' images & vote choice. Adapted from the source document.

Canada seems to refute Duverger's Law by sustaining more than two political parties in a plurality system, suggesting that Canadian voters do not utilize the 'wasted vote' calculus. However, many studies have found evidence of strategic voting in the electorate, although the work is limited because scholars have typically tested varying models at single points in time. This paper uses data from Canadian federal elections from 1988 to 2000 to test the expected utility model, developed by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972), on those with an incentive to vote strategically across all four elections. We extend the model to test hypotheses related to party system changes and individual factors (minor party support and political sophistication). Our findings strongly support the model and many of the individual level hypotheses, although the results pertaining to the system level hypotheses are mixed. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

AbstractWomen who ran for office in 2018 used a variety of strategies on the campaign trail, with some highlighting more masculine traits and others more feminine traits, but the latter was more common than in prior years. We ask how effective these strategies are for trait evaluations, perceptions of leadership and competence, likeability, and vote choice and how this effect varies based on respondent's views about the role of women in society. To explore these relationships, we use data from a two-wave panel conducted in the winter of 2019. Results from our experiment show that female candidates who highlight more masculine traits are perceived as more agentic, less communal, and more competent, and, importantly, they do not appear to suffer from a backlash effect. Those higher in sexism also evaluate women who display these qualities as more competent, though as less warm and likable.

During his tenure in office, President Trump made repeated attacks on democratic norms and practices in his public statements, in particular via Twitter. Does this type of anti-democratic rhetoric lead to an erosion of citizens' democratic attitudes? We argue that reactions to Trump's rhetoric are not likely to be uniform given the highly polarized political climate in the United States. In order to test this theoretical proposition, we fielded a survey experiment on a module of the 2019 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Treated respondents were exposed to a range of tweets sent by President Trump attacking three critical institutions of a liberal democracy (the media, Congress, and the Courts). We find limited evidence that Trump's rhetoric leads to an erosion of democratic attitudes. On the contrary, the results suggest there is significant pushback against anti-democratic messages, especially among Democrats.

Can racial and ethnic minorities be mobilized to participate in politics at greater rates? We theorize that mobilization messages providing information about a group's underrepresentation in government may increase participation among racial/ethnic minorities. However, responsiveness to such messages should vary depending on individuals' prior awareness of their group's underrepresentation. Using a two-wave panel survey that randomly assigned different get out the vote messages, we find that messages highlighting a racial/ethnic group's underrepresentation in government do not increase Latinos', Blacks', or Asians' likelihood of voting. We also find that such messages can decrease other forms of political participation among Asians and Latinos who were previously unaware of their group's underrepresentation. These findings indicate that information about underrepresentation can actually demobilize certain segments of the electorate. Thus, practical efforts to boost participation among underrepresented groups should either communicate information about underrepresentation in other ways or provide a different type of message altogether.