Political Parties and Network Formation
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 1918
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 1918
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We argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anticorruption laws also bind political parties.
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 59, S. 108-128
In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A's decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in embezzlement in that facing an honest Official A reduces embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement. Crucially, detection is more effective in curbing embezzlement when chosen by an honest Official A compared to a corrupt Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies can fail in countries where the government itself is believed to be corrupt.
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Working paper
In: IFN Working Paper No. 1010
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6358
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Working paper