Suchergebnisse

Andrew Geddes provides a European analysis of European
migration policy. He asks two questions: To what degree has
the European Union (EU) garnered control over migration
policies of member states? What is the policy outcome? In
answering these questions, the author makes two contribu-
tions to the literature.

Money reviews 'The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union' by Kathleen R. McNamara.

This paper examines a specific, generally south to north migratory flow—that of economic migrants from poor nations to advanced market economy countries. Most economic analyses agree that economic migration—as distinct from refugee flows—generates economic benefits. However, the level of benefits generated by these flows vary depending upon the types of migrants accepted (McCarthy and Vernez 1997). Moreover, these economic benefits are unevenly distributed among the host population in the short-term (National Research Council 1997). This uneven distribution creates a public backlash and political demands for restricting migration. To maintain openness toward migration, policies should tailor the level of migration to conditions in the local communities where migrants settle and redistribute the short-term costs associated with these migratory flows.

'Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after Unification' edited by Hermann Kurthen, Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erbs is reviewed.

This article examines the domestic political sources of immigration control in advanced market economy countries after World War II. Immigration control can be distinguished from the broader concept of immigration policy by its emphasis on state policies that define the permissible level of resident alien admissions. The analysis is based on the well-established fact that immigrant communities are geographically concentrated. I argue that this geographic concentration creates an uneven distribution of costs and benefits, providing a spatial context for immigration politics. In this context, net public demand for tighter immigration control increases in localities where immigrants concentrate when those areas experience higher unemployment, rapid increases in immigration, higher immigrant proportions, and more generous immigrant access to social services. Each of these conditions aggravates competition between immigrants and natives, and hence native hostility, in these communities while employer support for immigration usually diminishes. Yet national politicians may ignore changes in the demand for immigration control unless these constituencies are also able to swing a national election from one party to another. The larger and less "safe" the local constituencies, the greater their influence in this sense. Evidence from the United Kingdom between 1955 and 1981 is consistent with these propositions.

Westliche Demokratien unterscheiden sich erheblich in der Behandlung der Einwanderungsfrage und deren Kontrolle. Anhand der jeweiligen Unterschiede in den Staaten, die am weitesten von Einwanderung und deren Folgen betroffen sind, zeigt der Artikel auf, welche Faktoren jeweils Bedeutung für die einzelnen nationalen Politiken haben. So sind Arbeitslosigkeit, die soziale Lage innerhalb der Nationalstaaten und die damit verbunden Folgen meist ein Indikator für die Bereitschaft der Bevölkerung, Einwanderung zu akzeptieren oder fremdenfeindlich abzulehnen. Solange die politischen Parteien die konsequente Lösung der mit der Einwanderungspolitik verbundenen Fragen weiterhin zum Thema nationaler Wahlen machen und sich dadurch Wahlsiege erhoffen, kann das Problem nicht gelöst werden. Am Beispiel Großbritaniens wird deutlich, wie eine solche Politik aussehen kann (SWP-Fnk)

Examines domestic political sources of immigration policy in advanced market economy countries after World War II; emphasizes the geographic concentration of immigrants, with evidence from Great Britain, 1955-81.

This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments