Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan
In: American political science review, Band 78, Heft 1, S. 126
ISSN: 0003-0554
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In: American political science review, Band 78, Heft 1, S. 126
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: American political science review, Band 78, Heft 1
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: American political science review, Band 78, S. 126-146
ISSN: 0003-0554
This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1997
World Affairs Online
In: Japanese journal of political science, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 283-304
ISSN: 1474-0060
AbstractWhat determines whether interest groups choose to contact politicians or bureaucrats? Despite the importance of this question for policymaking, democracy, and some prominent principal-agent understandings of politics, it is relatively unexplored in the literature. We argue that government stability plays a major part in interest groups' decisions. That is, central to interest groups' decisions is their assessment of the likelihood that politicians currently in power will continue to be in the future. We deduce logical, but totally contrasting hypotheses, about how interest groups lobby under such conditions of uncertainty and then test these using a heteroskedastic probit model that we apply to a unique longitudinal survey of interest groups in Japan. We find that when it is unclear if the party controlling the government will maintain power in the future, interest groups are more likely to contact the bureaucracy. When it is believed that the party in power will retain control for a considerable period, interest groups are more inclined to contact politicians. In addition, during times of government uncertainty, interest groups that are supportive of the governing party (or parties) are more likely to contact politicians and those that are less supportive will be more likely to contact bureaucrats.
In: International review of public administration: IRPA, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 71-94
ISSN: 1229-4659
What happened under the rubric of small-government reform slogans during the era of cutback management in Japan and Korea? This paper analyzes and discusses the structural changes of the central state apparatus, and provides implications to the constraints and opportunities of administrative reforms in Japan and Korea. Applying the "bureau-shaping mode" of Patrick Dunleavy; we find substantive validity for the bureau-shaping strategy in both countries; both state apparatus have been shaping their delivery agencies into transfer, contract and control agencies. However, the degree of changes was not enough (especially, in Japan) to strongly test the hypotheses of the bureau-shaping model. Now, structural changes of the state apparatus in both countries are expected to be more radical than those in past years. And the explanatory power of the bureau-shaping model is anticipated to be greater in the future. (Int Rev o Publ Admin/DÜI)
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 1251
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 4, S. 939
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: British journal of political science, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 461-488
ISSN: 1469-2112
Using evidence from surveys of top administrators, we examine differences between Japanese and American administrative elites. Our findings are far more complex than the reigning stereotypes of an apolitical, technocratic and elitist Japanese bureaucracy contrasted to a politically charged, conflict-oriented and social-reformist American federal executive. For example, senior Japanese bureaucrats take political considerations into account, compared to technical ones, no less than top American officials. American administrators have a more negative view of the role of political parties than their Japanese counterparts and, on average, an equally negative view of politicians interfering in their work than the supposedly more elitist, autonomous and technocratic Japanese bureaucrats. The article closes with a discussion of why popular conceptions of the two bureaucracies break down in practice.
In: British journal of political science, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 461
ISSN: 0007-1234