Suchergebnisse

THE AUTHOR LOOKS AT THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES. HE DISCUSSES THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, AND HOW THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS HAVE ADAPTED TO EU MEMBERSHIP. HE HYPOTHESIZES THAT NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS HAVE RESPONDED TO THE CHALLENGES OF EU INTEGRATION BY IMPLEMENTING THEIR OWN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU), POWER HAS CLEARLY PASSED FROM NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EU. THIS IS A CONSEQUENCE OF MEMBERSHIP AND HAS BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY. AS POLICY-MAKING POWER HAS PASSED TO BRUSSELS, SO THOSE SEEKING TO INFLUENCE POLICY HAVE SHIFTED THEIR ATTENTION THERE AS WELL. NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO FORMAL ROLE IN EU POLICY MAKING, EXCEPT INDIRECTLY THROUGH NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS OR IN A SPORADIC, ADVISORY FORM THROUGH THE CONFERENCE OF PARLIAMENTS. ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP THE MEANS OF EXERTING INFLUENCE HAVE BEEN LIMITED AND LARGELY UNPRODUCTIVE. MANY NATIONAL EUROPEAN COMMITTEES HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY COPING WITH THE BURDEN OF EU DOCUMENTS, AND SOME HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES. THE SHIFT OF POLITICAL POWER UPWARDS TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EU HAS NOT BEEN MATCHED BY A SHIFT IN DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, EITHER THROUGH NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OR AT THE LEVEL OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP). THE EP HAS INCREASED ITS POWERS ENORMOUSLY BUT IS STILL ONLY ON THE EDGE OF CONSTITUTING A LEGISLATURE. UNTIL POPULAR PERCEPTIONS CHANGE AND THE EP ACQUIRES THE STATUS IT SEEKS, THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT NOT ONLY WILL REMAIN BUT MAY BECOME MORE, RATHER THAN LESS, PRONOUNCED.

THE UNITED KINGDOM BECAME A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) ON JANUARY 1, 1973. THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO ITS MEMBERSHIP WERE FAR FROM HARMONIOUS, AND THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS A LATE AND RELUCTANT EC MEMBER, AND IT HAS REMAINED A RELUCTANT MEMBER IN MANY RESPECTS. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL REASONS, THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT HAS SOUGHT TO SCRUTINIZE EC DOCUMENTS AND TO INFLUENCE DELIBERATIONS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. BOTH HOUSES HAVE ESTABLISHED COMMITTEES TO UNDERTAKE SCRUTINY OF EC DOCUMENTS, AND THESE TWO COMMITTEES EFFECTIVELY COMPLIMENT ONE ANOTHER. BOTH BENEFIT FROM THE PROVISION OF EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, A PROVISION NOT COMMON IN OTHER SYSTEMS. BOTH COMMITTEES HAVE BUILT LINKS WITH EC INSTITUTIONS AND COMMITTEES IN OTHER NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS HAVE LIMITED THE CAPACITY OF BOTH HOUSES TO HAVE A CONTINUOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION.

Drawing on the work of Robert Packenham, identifies 10 functions that may be ascribed to Parliament. Parliament scores well on most of the Mezey indicators for determining a more supported legislature. Although recently Parliament's capacity to maintain support has been questioned, this appears to derive from a false premise: that there has been a decline in the public's trust. (SJK)

Suggests that the 7 legislatures under scrutiny will continue to display the resilience that has marked them out in recent years. However, nothing is certain. For legislatures of Western Europe, the best way to maintain their policy affect and their support is for them to assume that they will not. (SJK)

NAA

THIS STUDY IDENTIFIES TWO WORKING HYPOTHESES IN REGARD TO LEGISLATURES IN ASIA. FIRST, THAT THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT WILL DETERMINE THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATURE TO THE EXECUTIVE AND SECOND, THAT INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS WILL DETERMINE HOW STRONG OR WEAK IT IS WITHIN THE PARTICULAR CATEGORY. THE STUDY ALSO IDENTIFIES THE PRINCIPAL VARIABLES THAT ALLOW THE AUTHORS TO ANALYZE AND COMPARE LEGISLATURES AND TEST THEIR HYPOTHESES. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO PROVIDE BOTH RICH DESCRIPTIONS OF PARTICULAR LEGISLATURES AND TO FURTHER THE UNDERSTANDING OF LEGISLATURES AS A PARTICULAR SPECIES OF INSTITUTION.

LEGISLATURES ARE UBIQUITOUS AND HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS. THE FOCUS OF ANALYSIS HAS TYPICALLY BEEN THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN AFFECTING POLICY OUTCOMES IN AN ESTABLISHED POLITY. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANALYZING THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN REGIME TRANSITIONS HAVE BEEN LIMITED. THE TRANSITION FROM COMMUNIST REGIMES TO NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE PROVIDES A RICH FIELD FOR ANALYSIS. THIS PAPER PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, IDENTIFYING TWO KEY VARIABLES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING THE SPECIFIC EXPERIENCES OF A NATION AND BORROWING FROM FOREIGN PRACTICE AND THREE SETS OF VARIABLES IN DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT, INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND POLICY ATTRIBUTES.

APPLYING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK OUTLINED IN THE INTRODUCTION, THIS PAPER FINDS THAT IN THE NEW DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BORROWING FROM THE OLD REGIME RATHER THAN FROM WESTERN EXPERTISE IS PREDOMINANT IN CONSTITUTION MAKING AND THAT THE POLICY ACTIVITY OF THE NEW PARLIAMENTS IS SHAPED PREDOMINANTLY BY EXTERNAL INFLUENCES. THE FLUID NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND LIMITED PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY FACILITATE POLICY ACTIVITY AT THE EXPENSE OF "RESPONSIBLE" PARTY GOVERNMENT. POLICY ATTRIBUTES ARE SHAPED BY THE STANCE TOWARD THE OLD REGIME. A PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION IS APPARENT, WITH GREATER ACTIVITY, COMMITTEE SPECIALIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL SOPHISTICATION.

THE ASSUMPTION THAT CANDIDATES MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO ELECTORAL OUTCOMES IN BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS IS TESTED THROUGH A COMPARISON OF THE 1983 AND 1987 GENERAL ELECTIONS. INCUMBENT'S CONSTITUENCY-SPECIFIC VOTE CHANGE (ICVC) BETWEEN THE JUNE 1983 AND JUNE 1987 BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS IS MEASURED BY SUBTRACTING THE AVERAGE REGIONAL VOTE CHANGE FOR THE INCUMBENT'S PARTY FROM THE CONSTITUENCY VOTE CHANGE REGISTERED BY THE INCUMBENT. REGRESSION ANALYSIS FINDS ICVC TO BE MOST SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED IN BOTH THE LABOR AND CONSERVATIVE PARTIES BY THE INCUMBENT'S LENTH OF TENURE. VARIABLES INDICATING THE SECURITY OR INSECURITY OF THE SEAT IN ELECTORAL TERMS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY RELATED TO ICVC IN THE CONSERVATIVE BUT NOT IN THE LABOR CASE. THE FINDINGS FOR LABOR INDICATE ICVC TO BE GREATER WHERE ELECTORAL SECURITY IS GREATER. THIS FINDING MIGHT BE EXPLAINED BY SUCCESSFUL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONCENTRATION ON CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH LABOR INCUMBENTS APPEAR TO BE VULNERABLE.

Incumbent's Constituency-specific Vote Change (ICVC) between the June 1983 and June 1987 British general elections is measured by subtracting the average regional vote change for the incumbent's party from the constituency vote change registered by the incumbent. Regression analysis finds ICVC influenced in both the Labour and Conservative parties by the incumbent's length of tenure. (Abstract amended)