Suchergebnisse

The books reviewed in this article focus on unions struggling to survive and on states seeking to install and stabilize a post-Fordist regime based on individual over collective incorporation of labor. Established unions deploy organizational, institutional, or cultural resources for protection but continue to lose ground. But this neoliberal regulatory regime, theorized by Deyo as an 'augmented Washington Consensus,' is not just an attack, but also an effort to reincorporate labor without the collective rights of the past. Pushback against unions is accompanied by efforts to tie workers individually to the state. Yet, the use of political liberalism to promote economic liberalism can cause fights against the latter to take the form of political illiberalism. The books thus demonstrate that efforts to marginalize labor are highly consequential for both states and democracy. Adapted from the source document.

Maybe it's because Ryszard Kapuscinski told so many stories about himself that little is actually known about him. We meet him in the alleyways of Dakar and the bazaars of Tehran, the trenches in Angola and the sidestreets of Tegucigalpa, just as the city is being attacked. He doesn't so much describe these places as invites us to taste them, and we can do so through his perfect vignettes about his interactions with the people and the physical surroundings. Despite all this intimacy, we never know who he is. For he doesn't write about himself but about "Ryszard Kapuscinski," the hero of his books who has all these revealing encounters.

Now we have a guide who tells us of the man, not the hero, in his context of communist Poland. Artur Domosławski, himself a Polish journalist who modeled himself on Kapuscinski—he calls him his "mentor" or "master"—tells us two stories: one about Kapuscinski, and one about the Poland that made him.

Ten years after the publication of 'Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe', the author re-examines his claim that tripartite arrangements introduced in the region after 1989 served chiefly as a façade for introducing neoliberal policies undermining labour interests. He finds that tripartism still produces meagre results, and that most of what labour has gained has come from better organisation, smarter use of resources, and increased militancy, not from tripartism. While 'illusory corporatism' is sustained in Eastern Europe, it is advancing elsewhere in the world. He looks at Latin America and Asia, which resemble 1990s Eastern Europe, as governments introduce tripartism at crisis moments in order to win labour commitments to cutbacks. As for Western Europe, where many scholars have seen an advancement of corporatism because of the signing of pacts in countries where the traditional preconditions were lacking, the author argues that this corporatism is 'illusory' because pacts are made to secure labour's acceptance to the corrosion of union power and a decline in labour conditions. Standards of corporatism have been systematically ratcheted down. Many scholars see 'corporatism' wherever agreements are signed, whereas an outcome-based approach, proposed by the author in his original article, leads to a characterization of 'illusory corporatism'.

The plethora of tripartite bodies in postcommunist countries seems to suggest the emergence of an East European corporatism. Analysis of arrangements in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland indicates instead the prevalence of illusory corporatism. Token negotiations, non-binding agreements, and exclusion of the private sector demonstrate that tripartite procedures are deployed to introduce neoliberal, not social democratic, outcomes. A path-dependent argument stressing labour's weak class identity best explains these outcomes. East European labour, unlike historic western counterparts, is marked by a weak sense of class interests, disinclination to organize the private sector, and declining support from the workforce, making it unable to emerge as a strong force. It is not labour but the new elites that seek tripartism, hoping thereby to share burdens, conform to European norms, and demonstrate responsiveness to society. Formal tripartism also follows from the legacy of state socialism, giving symbolic voice to the formerly included now headed for exclusion. In the end, tripartism helps secure labour's acceptance of its own marginalization.

Following a long period in which labor in Eastern Europe had been marginalized, often with unionists' complicity, five conditions now favor revival: survival imperatives of the union bureaucracy, incorporation into the European Union, emerging international solidarity, a new generation of workers, and the end of postcommunism in the firm, or the dismissal of unessential workers. This article focuses on subjective factors: union officials' own misgivings about unions in the postcommunist era and their revived interest now that they no longer need to defend the unskilled. Yet three factors work against union revival: ideological (continued distrust of unions), organizational (plethora of small firms), and structural (location in the global economy). Labor is likely to remain weak, with a few stronger unions emerging that are more elitist, male, "producerist," and less class oriented. Legacies continue to be the major problem, but in a twist, the problem today is the legacy not of communism but of postcommunism.

Just as the availability of new ideas can drive the development of new institutions, the unavailability of ideas also has powerful political effects. The article demonstrates the paradoxical absence of class discourse in postcommunist Polish political debates--paradoxical because the same actors who eschewed class discourse believed that postcommunist class formation and inequalities were the central problems shaping the country and driving the political agenda. The paper documents the early thinking about class and politics on the part of key political activists. It traces their fear of class discourse to their limited knowledge of postwar European capitalisms and the role played by strong labor movements in stabilizing those systems. Ironically, Poles understood capitalism in too Marxist a way, as a perennially raging struggle between classes. Knowing that workers would lose out in the new system, they feared that speaking about class would empower workers as a class and thus weaken the market economy they were determined to build. Not generally aware how class compromise in the post-World War II era worked to stabilize capitalism, Polish (and most other eastern European) oppositionists did their best to thwart the emergence of class identities on the part of those left behind, even at the cost, for liberals, of reconciling themselves to political defeat. The result of the refusal to countenance class discourse was not a block on the emergence of class anger, but a displacement of that anger from class 'others' to identity-based others, and thus a weakening of the liberal politics that most postcommunist liberals had wished to reinforce. A final section explores recent Polish thinking about class in the context of reactions to the Polish edition of my Defeat of Solidarity book showing continued mainstream reluctance to talk about class but new interest in this category among youth. Adapted from the source document.