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This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.

This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political ...

This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.

We analyze within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on regional inequality. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. The "optimal" size of the local public inputs - as measured by the expenditure share ratios - differs depending upon the extent to which the governments take interregional interdependencies and feedback effects into account. The resulting spatial distribution of economic activity is driven by integration, which acts as dispersion force, and scale effects, which act as concentration force. The latter are drivers of regional inequality. Given full symmetry, local externalities cancel w.r.t to their impact on spatial concentration. We show that coordination of public decisions that base on productivity considerations unequivocally foster concentration and destabilize the spreading equilibrium. Regional inequality is thus an optimal result or put differently, the convergence goal can only be met by applying additional arguments.

This paper employs a dynamic framework to compare the effects of alternative government activities on convergence of industrialized economies to the technology frontier. The government's Instruments include facilitating private investment and education policy. The latter enhances skills of heterogenous specialists and imply the decision on their respective shares. The analysis distinguishes between an isolated policy of a single economy and coordinated policies of various countries. Which policy maximizes the speed of convergence is crucially affected by the economy's state of development. A policy switch between the mentioned instruments while catching-up may be preferable.

This paper employs a dynamic framework to compare the effects of alternative governmental activities on the process of convergence. Policy instruments include facilitating private investment and public expenditure (amount and structure) that act as enhancing individual skills. Highly skilled specialists are endowed with both technological and systemic skills, though to different extents. We analyze how governmental activity speeds up convergence thereby considering productivity growth at the technology frontier either as exogenous or as endogenous parameter. Which policy maximizes the speed of convergence is crucially affected by a country's state of development. A policy switch while catching-up may be preferable.