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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF STRONG PARTY SYSTEMS BY ANALYZING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTY SYSTEMS AND SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN 28 DEMOCRACIES OF THE 1967-1976 DECADE. THE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT DURING THIS PERIOD EXTREMIST PARTY SUPPORT WAS ASSOCIATED WITH EXECUTIVE INSTABILITY AND MASS RIOTING.

Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.

Because political evaluation is both inescapable and desirable, it is too important to be left to partial and unexamined criteria. Even the most self-conscious studies of political performance have tended to rely on a limited and incomplete range of standards. We are arguing here for a more comprehensive typology of "political goods," with which both the standards and the performance of specific regimes and ideologies can be compared. Although we cannot, of course, deal with every cultural and structural nuance that may itself be valued, we can attempt to consider explicitly classes of goods that are associated with each of the different levels of analysis of the political system.

Comparative studies of election rules and legislative representation have focused intensively on vote-seat disproportionality as an indication of poor representation. Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has important advantages and is especially more appropriate for a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of election rules on both vote-seat correspondence and median left-right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions necessary to reduce vote-seat disproportionality in high threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and higher levels) of distortion. Although good median correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this criterion also. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

To address concerns over the applicability of the electoral system literature to new and developing democracies, we present a framework for understanding the interplay between electoral rules and social, economic, and political context. This framework emphasizes that context typically shapes what we call the "behavioral" linkage between electoral rules and outcomes; moreover, the longer the causal chain connecting electoral rules to outcomes, the greater the number of opportunities for context to exert an effect. We then situate recent literature within this framework. Scholarship from a wide range of authors indicates many different ways in which contextual factors ultimately shape the number of parties. However, perhaps the most important contribution of this literature is to indicate how context conditions the behavioral incentives initially generated by electoral rules, thus promoting or undermining political actors' propensity to behave strategically.

To address concerns over the applicability of the electoral system literature to new and developing democracies, we present a framework for understanding the interplay between electoral rules and social, economic, and political context. This framework emphasizes that context typically shapes what we call the 'behavioral' linkage between electoral rules and outcomes; moreover, the longer the causal chain connecting electoral rules to outcomes, the greater the number of opportunities for context to exert an effect. We then situate recent literature within this framework. Scholarship from a wide range of authors indicates many different ways in which contextual factors ultimately shape the number of parties. However, perhaps the most important contribution of this literature is to indicate how context conditions the behavioral incentives initially generated by electoral rules, thus promoting or undermining political actors' propensity to behave strategically. Adapted from the source document.

Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.

The effects of party system features and election rules on ideological representation can be seen in parliamentary elections in Western democracies over a fifty-year period. 'Distortion' is short-term representation failure -- the distance between the median voter and the legislature or government immediately after the election. Electoral choice and left-right positions of parties (from the manifesto data) can be used to estimate median voter positions. The number of parties, party polarization, and the election rules all independently affect ideological distances. But party system polarization seems to be the predominate factor shaping distortion of governments' relationship with the median voter. Examining the effects of party systems under different election rules helps clarify the causal connections between legislative and government levels. Adapted from the source document.