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Abstract:This paper situates Elinor Ostrom's work on common-pool resource management in the tradition of 'robust political economy'. Ostrom's analysis of bottom-up governance institutions is shown to recognise that such arrangements though imperfect are better placed to cope with bounded rationality and incentive compatibility problems in the management of smaller- and medium-scale common-pool resources. While Ostrom's work provides an analytical framework to explain the success of these arrangements, however, the paper argues that it lacks a robust account of when, if ever, top-down governance arrangements are to be preferred.

Drawing on the perspective of classical liberalism, and developing a comparative institutions framework through which to evaluate alternative proposals for environmental improvement, the case is made for a system of polycentric environmental law. Within this context, contemporary theories that favour an extension of state regulation in order to address the trans-boundary nature of environmental goods are challenged. Problems arising from the complexity of social and ecological processes, the collective nature of environmental goods and the distributive consequences of environmental protection are unlikely to be met by a framework that emphasises greater unity in decisions. On the contrary, the principle of ecological rationality is more likely to be met within a classical liberal framework that facilitates market-like processes of competitive spontaneous order at multiple levels. (Environmental Politics / FUB)

Contends that free-market environmentalism will continue to have little impact on the environmental movement unless it recasts its argument in ways that speak to the "communitarian greens" on their own terms. One way to accomplish this is to employ a Hayekian perspective to restate the case for free-market environmentalism because the conclusions of Hayekian liberalism "are more consistent with the nonreductionist foundations of green communitarianism than are the conclusions of the communitarians themselves." Arguments against free-market environmentalism proffered by green communitarians are examined alongside economist F. A. Hayek's (1948-1988) views of liberalism to show that none of the communitarian arguments against rational-choice liberalism provides an effective case against market, especially environmental, institutions. Ontological assumptions of communitarian thought shared by a Hayekian perspective & differences between Hayekian liberalism & communitarian ontology are pointed out. A case is made for a property-rights approach to issues of environmental protection as opposed to challenges to the liberal market posed by green communitarianism. 42 References. J. Lindroth

Inspired by Habermasian critiques of liberalism, supporters of deliberative democracy seek an extension of social democratic institutions to further a reinvigorated communicative rationality against the 'atomism' of market processes. This paper offers a critique of deliberative democratic theory from a Hayekian perspective. For Hayek, the case against the social democratic state rests with the superior capacity of markets to extend communicative rationality beyond the realm of verbal discourse.

Focusing on house prices and residential densities, this paper offers a comparative institutions account of the likely performance of public and private land use planning regimes. The analysis suggests that whilst far from 'perfect,' a system of private land use planning is likely to offer a more effective way of balancing the costs and benefits of land use change than a government‐driven system.