Suchergebnisse

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries & loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries & beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and a firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare in a game with a multinational firm with those in an otherwise identical game with a national firm. For low transportation costs, output and pollution of a national firm are always as least as high as for a multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare levels are always higher with multinationals than with national firms. However, the existence of lobbying may reverse this ordering. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare for national and multinational firms, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the influence of the firm. For low transportation costs, output and pollution of a national firm is always as least as high as for a multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare levels are always higher with multinationals than with national firms. However, the existence of lobbying may reverse this ordering.

Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-exports effect and the multiple-plant effect. The interplay of these three forces determines whether national or multinational firms produce more, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the in uence of the firm. We also show that welfare levels are higher with multinational firms than with national firms when there is no lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering.