Optimal debt management in a liquidity trap
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 93, S. 5-21
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 93, S. 5-21
ISSN: 0165-1889
This paper estimates an open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Bayesian techniques to analyse the macroeconomic effects of the European Central Bank's (ECB's) quantitative easing (QE) programme. Using data on government debt stocks and yields across maturities, we identify the parameter governing portfolio adjustment in the private sector. Shock decompositions suggest a positive contribution of ECB QE to annual euro area output growth and inflation in 2015-16 of up to 0.3 and 0.6 percentage points (pp) in the linearised version of the model. Allowing for an occasionally binding zero-bound constraint by using piecewise linear solution techniques raises the positive impact to up to 0.7 and 0.8 pp.
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This paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of the ECB's quantitative easing programme using an open-economy DSGE model estimated with Bayesian techniques. Using data on government debt stocks and yields across maturities we identify the parameter governing portfolio adjustment in the private sector. Shock decompositions suggest a positive contribution of ECB QE to EA year-on-year output growth and inflation of up to 0.4 and 0.5 pp in the standard linearized version of the model. Allowing for an occasionally binding zero-bound constraint by using piecewise linear solution techniques raises the positive impact up to 1.0 and 0.7 pp, respectively.
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We study optimal debt management in the face of shocks that can precipitate the economy into a liquidity trap and call for an increase in public spending in order to mitigate the resulting recession. Our approach follows the sizable literature of macroeconomic models of debt management, which we extend to the case where the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rate binds. We wish to identify the conditions under which removing long debt from the secondary market can become an optimal policy outcome. We show that the optimal debt-management strategy is to issue short-term debt if the government faces a sizable exogenous increase in public spending and if its initial liability is not very large. In this case, our results run against the standard prescription of the debt-management literature. Finally, we show that when the government sets optimally the level of public spending, the optimality of long-term debt is restored.
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We study optimal debt management in the face of shocks that can precipitate the economy into a liquidity trap and call for an increase in public spending in order to mitigate the resulting recession. Our approach follows the sizable literature of macroeconomic models of debt management, which we extend to the case where the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rate binds. We wish to identify the conditions under which removing long debt from the secondary market can become an optimal policy outcome. We show that the optimal debt-management strategy is to issue short-term debt if the government faces a sizable exogenous increase in public spending and if its initial liability is not very large. In this case, our results run against the standard prescription of the debt-management literature. Finally, we show that when the government sets optimally the level of public spending, the optimality of long-term debt is restored.
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2024/2935
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In: De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 697
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Working paper
This paper explores the optimal allocation of government bond purchases within a monetary union, using a two-region DSGE model, where regions are asymmetric with respect to economic size and portfolio characteristics: the extent of substitutability between assets of different maturity and origin, asset home bias, and steady-state levels of government debt. An optimal quantitative easing (QE) policy under commitment does not only reflect different region sizes but is also a function of these dimensions of portfolio heterogeneity. By calibrating the model to the euro area, we show that optimal QE favors purchases from the smaller region (Periphery instead of Core), given that the former faces stronger portfolio frictions. A fully optimal policy consisting of both the short-term interest rate and QE lifts the monetary union away from the zero lower bound faster than an optimal interest rate policy alone, which entails forward guidance.
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This paper reviews and summarizes the literature on the complementary relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy. We focus on four types of fiscal policy: (1) automatic stabilizers, (2) state-contingent non-discretionary fiscal policy, (3) discretionary fiscal stimulus and (4) government credit policies. The literature shows that automatic fiscal stabilizers can play a role in stabilizing business cycle fluctuation. But because they can have multiple policy objectives, their optimal design remains an open question. An alternative policy framework features state-contingent non-discretionary fiscal expenditures with a pre-committed fiscal spending formula triggered by objective macroeconomic conditions. Such a policy offers the advantage of being timely and easy to communicate; but at the same time, it poses challenges for identifying appropriate triggers and program expenditures with high short-run multipliers. The literature also shows that discretionary fiscal expenditures can support aggregate demand, and some expenditures have short-run multipliers close to, or above, 1. While these expenditures can focus on specific policy priorities that are relevant at the time, their discretionary nature may slow the policy response. When interest rates are close to the effective lower bound (ELB), fiscal stimulus can be particularly effective for complementing the stabilizing efforts of monetary policy. Finally, studies show that government credit policies can mitigate economic downturns that are accompanied by severe financial market distress. However, the effects of scaling up this channel are uncertain.
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In: ECB Occasional Paper No. 2024/344
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