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Negotiation with non-ideological ethno-nationalist terrorists is more common & more successful than with other kinds of terrorists. Additional strategies for dealing with terrorists include combating, isolating, & mainstreaming. There are many arguments against negotiation with terrorists, but most of them do not apply to secret backchannel talks, which are usually the method of choice in first approaching these groups. The success of negotiation depends on the development of flexibility by both the terrorists & the authorities. These & other points are illustrated with case materials from the Northern Ireland peace process, & the analysis is extended, on a speculative basis, to negotiation with several Islamic terrorist groups. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Field experiments, in which the researcher manipulates one or more variables in a naturally occurring setting, have sometimes been used in studies of social conflict & should probably be used more often. They are more useful than observational studies for assessing the impact of novel conditions, establishing cause & effect, & reducing confounding. & they are more useful than laboratory experiments for examining long-term effects & those that involve strong passions, & for establishing external validity. However field experiments also have their limitations. Some variables cannot be practically or ethically manipulated & require the use of observational methods, which are also more useful for looking at the relationships among a large number of variables & for estimating the strength of association between variables. Furthermore, laboratory experiments allow more control of conditions & greater flexibility in designing manipulations. What this suggests is that all three methods have their value. References. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses possible approaches to dispute settlement of ethnic conflicts; case studies. Included in a collection of articles under the overall title "When and how to resolve ethnic conflicts". Oslo process between Israel and the Palestinians, London talks that established Zimbabwe, Northern Ireland peace process, intermediaries, chains, and two-track diplomacy, secrecy, and chain shortening and final negotiations.

Negotiation is usually an outgrowth of a broader conflict episode in which one party, the claimant, is trying to persuade another party, the respondent, to take an action it does not wish to take. Claimants typically employ a script-driven sequence of tactics, changing their approach until the conflict is resolved or they give up. If negotiation is part of this sequence, it ordinarily comes after moderate escalation. Six of the most common tactics in conflict episodes are forms of firm flexibility: concede but only to a point, hold firm on one's position while seeking a way to compensate the other, hold firm on more important issues while conceding on less important issues, hold firm on one's interests while seeking novel ways to achieve these interests, hold firm on more important interests while abandoning less important interests, and hold firm if one's interests seem stronger than those of the other party and yield if the other's interests seem stronger. The last of these tactics leads to high joint benefit in continuing relationships. If continuing relationships are fragile, there is a tendency to emphasize flexibility over firmness. By contrast, in conflict episodes involving organizations, firmness tends to be emphasized over flexibility. Several remedies are suggested for the latter problem.

NEGOTIATION IS USUALLY AN OUTGROWTH OF A BROADER CONFLICT EPISODE IN WHICH ONE PARTY, THE CLAIMANT, IT TRYING TO PERSUADE ANOTHER PARTY, THE RESPONDENT, TO TAKE AN ACTION IT DOES NOT WISH TO TAKE. CLAIMANTS TYPICALLY EMPLOY A SCRIPT-DRIVEN SEQUENCE OF TACTICS, CHANGING THEIR APPROACH UNTIL THE CONFLICT IS RESOLVED OR THEY GIVE UP. IF NEGOTIATION IS PART OF THIS SEQUENCE, IT ORDINARILY COMES AFTER MODERATE ESCALATION. SIX OF THE MOST COMMON TACTICS IN CONFLICT EPISODES ARE FORMS OF FIRM FLEXIBILITY: CONCEDE BUT ONLY TO A POINT, HOLD FIRM ON ONE'S POSITION WHILE SEEKING A WAY TO COMPENSATE THE OTHER, HOLD FIRM ON MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES WHILE CONCEDING ON LESS IMPORTANT ISSUES, HOLD FIRM ON ONE'S WHILE SEEKING NOVEL WAYS TO ACHIEVE THESE INTERESTS, HOLD FIRM ON MORE IMPORTANT INTERESTS WHILE ABANDONING LESS IMPORTANT INTERESTS, AND HOLD FIRM IF ONE'S INTERESTS SEEM STRONGER THAN THOSE OF THE OTHER PARTY AND YIELD IF THE OTHER'S INTERESTS SEEM STRONGER. THE LAST OF THESE TACTICS LEADS TO HIGH JOINT BENEFIT IN CONTINUING RELATIONSHIPS. IF CONTINUING RELATIONSHIPS ARE FRAGILE, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE FLEXIBILITY OVER FIRMNESS. BY CONTRAST, IN CONFLICT EPISODES INVOLVING ORGANIZATIONS, FIRMNESS TENDS TO BE EMPHASIZED OVER FLEXIBILITY. SEVERAL REMEDIES ARE SUGGESTED FOR THE LATTER PROBLEM.

Four basic negotiating strategies are analyzed along with the outcomes they encourage and the determinants of their use. Guidelines for influencing the strategic choice of one's bargaining partners are also presented with an emphasis on techniques for encouraging one's adversaries to move away from contentious behavior and toward problem solving.

An endeavor to contribute to the theory about the relations between pairs of nations & to the theory about relations between 2 parties of any kind, whether nations, org's, groups, or individuals. A geometric interpretation of reciprocation & the way reciprocative changes are sequenced over time is presented, based on the writings of L. F. Richardson (ARMS AND INSE- CURITY: A MATHEMATICAL STUDY OF THE CAUSES AND ORIGINS OF WAR, Pittsburgh, Pa: Boxwood Press, 1960). The notions of stability & instability are analyzed within this framework. Reciprocation is first seen in terms of 'reaction functions.' Then 'reaction systems' in which 2 reaction-functions are combined are employed to interpret sequences over time. Next a particular reaction system, involving S-shaped curves, is examined in depth. The dynamics of this system permit an interpretation of sudden change & hence of stability & instability. 2 basic components of instability are defined: (a) the likelihood that momentary forces will develop that have sufficient power to push the joint location over a boundary & sufficient duration to keep it there until it moves to the quadrant opposite to that in which it started; (b) the closeness of the boundaries to the equilibrium point currently occupied. Instability can be seen as a function of (1) the rate of rise from the lower equilibrium point; (2) the rate of fall from the upper equilibrium point; or (c) the location of the current equilibrium point. A number of hyp's are advanced about the determinants of stability, which are based on the dynamics of this system. Factors which may either reduce or increase the closeness of the boundaries to the equilibrium point include: the possession of a common enemy as a source of interdependence; 3rd-party pressures for moderation; certain soc norms which enhance stability by dampening reactions to provocation from another party; the military technology involved in a conflict as a contributor to the stability or instability of a relationship (eg, existence or nonexistence of intermediate levels of reaction to provocation); psychol'al factors; perceptions of the future; awareness of an impending vicious circle; the doctrine of deterrence, etc. Change in interpersonal or internat'l relations often takes the form of vicious or benevolent circles. Multipolar systems tend to be more stable in a number of these factors than bipolar systems. Stable relations usually show oscilliations around an equilibrium point, ie, mutually-cancelling benevolent & vicious circles. Sudden change in the location of an equilibrium point typically results from one party's moving 'too far' along a critical dimension, which initiates a runaway vicious or benevolent circle. Instability can be defined as the likelihood of sudden change & hence the likelihood that one party will go 'too far.' M. Maxfield.