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This article uses Sartori's classification of party systems to map changes in the post-war UK party system. Using measures of the effective number of parties and of parties' policy positions, the article shows that 'classic' two-partism from 1950 to 1970 broke down amid ideological polarisation. This development created a 'vacated centre', which the Liberals filled, leading to fragmentation of the electoral-party system. This period gave way in 1997 to one in which ideological convergence returned, alongside further electoral fragmentation. The uneven decline in the vote shares of the parties finishing first and second led to supermajorities and two long periods of single-party rule from 1979 to 2010. The article argues that the UK had an alternating-predominant party system in this period. This system was a hybrid of single-party predominance and classic two-partism, in which competition between the two main parties was usually very weak but where there was some scope for governmental alternation. Adapted from the source document.

This article uses Sartori's classification of party systems to map changes in the post-war UK party system. Using measures of the effective number of parties and of parties' policy positions, the article shows that 'classic' two-partism from 1950 to 1970 broke down amid ideological polarisation. This development created a 'vacated centre', which the Liberals filled, leading to fragmentation of the electoral-party system. This period gave way in 1997 to one in which ideological convergence returned, alongside further electoral fragmentation. The uneven decline in the vote shares of the parties finishing first and second led to supermajorities and two long periods of single-party rule from 1979 to 2010. The article argues that the UK had an alternating-predominant party system in this period. This system was a hybrid of single-party predominance and classic two-partism, in which competition between the two main parties was usually very weak but where there was some scope for governmental alternation.

The rise of "spin doctors" and news management is one of the most important changes in British party politics. However, this development has been under-theorised. This article fills this gap in the literature by providing a rational-choice model of news management, in which parties supply information on things such as policies and intra-party gossip to journalists in return for favourable coverage. Basing itself on recent research on the media, the article develops a cost benefit model of news-story production in which the constant onset of deadlines leaves journalists considerably dependent on official information sources, such as spin doctors. Drawing mainly from the experience of New Labour in Britain, the article discusses various techniques for maximising positive coverage and counteracting negative coverage, and shows how they relate to the theoretical framework. It concludes that news management is inevitable when parties communicate through news media that make their own choices over which stories to run. Adapted from the source document.