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Scholars offer differing accounts of the roles played by political elites, on the one hand, and ordinary citizens, on the other, in the highly polarized partisan conflict of contemporary American politics. Some take polarized elite conflict to indicate, in itself, that elected policymakers have escaped the constraints of democratic control and act essentially independently. In sharp contrast to this view, I outline a case for the importance of what I call polarized populism—a condition of politics in which elected officials accord very substantial deference to ordinary citizens, especially those who hold relatively extreme ideological views. I clarify the differences between elite centered and populist accounts of polarized policymaking, and then develop the argument for polarized populism, presenting theoretical considerations in support and assessing several kinds of relevant evidence. I also reply to some claims by Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, proponents of the elite-centered view, in an earlier exchange in the Forum. In concluding, I comment briefly about some directions for research to assess the case for polarized populism and discuss some broader implications of this pattern of policymaking.

The capabilities of the American state sometimes depend on the ability of policy-makers to act autonomously, on the basis of their own preferences and beliefs, in ways that serve broad societal and state interests but lack support from powerful constituencies. In a highly acclaimed book on the politics of health care reform in the Clinton administration, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that "politicians don't pander." Rather, they do indeed act on their own ideological and policy views, using polls mainly to guide rhetorical strategy, not to make policy decisions. I challenge their interpretation and bring to bear other considerations to argue for an increased influence of mass opinion, and to present a high-pandering, limited-autonomy account of the contemporary politics of law-making. In concluding, I comment briefly on this account's consistency with recent events and on the issues it poses for future research.

The capabilities of the American state sometimes depend on the ability of policy-makers to act autonomously, on the basis of their own preferences and beliefs, in ways that serve broad societal and state interests but lack support from powerful constituencies. In a highly acclaimed book on the politics of health care reform in the Clinton administration, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that "politicians don't pander." Rather, they do indeed act on their own ideological and policy views, using polls mainly to guide rhetorical strategy, not to make policy decisions. I challenge their interpretation and bring to bear other considerations to argue for an increased influence of mass opinion, and to present a high-pandering, limited-autonomy account of the contemporary politics of law-making. In concluding, I comment briefly on this account's consistency with recent events and on the issues it poses for future research. Adapted from the source document.

Tulis's critique of popular presidential leadership raises several questions about public opinion: Do modern, rhetorically inclined presidents influence the public? What types of presidential rhetoric might, in principle, mislead or manipulate the public? And is the net result that the people are led into error and distortion in their policy opinions? The public-opinion literature, which has assiduously documented the public's ignorance about politics and policy, might seem, at first glance, to offer grounds for an unequivocal 'yes' to the third question. But most scholars of public opinion discount public ignorance and defend an optimistic view of the citizenry's political competence. The more convincing arguments and evidence, however, support more critical views. There is ample reason to worry about the consequences of policy making driven by popular rhetoric, and thus to consider whether any remedies for plebiscitary democracy might be found. Adapted from the source document.